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Malagon, Anthony. Ph.D., Purdue University, December 2013. An Existential Proof of 
God. Major Professor: Daniel Smith.  
 
The following dissertation defends the view that one can have knowledge of God 
outside of what might be called the realm of objectivity, or objective thought, within 
which all traditional proofs of God lie.  In other words, it will be argued that even if it is 
conceded that a conclusive proof of God is not possible, one can, nevertheless, be 
justified in one’s belief in God without recourse to the traditional vein of logical-
objective proofs.  To do so, I call upon the works of Soren Kierkegaard and Gabriel 
Marcel, both of whom reject the view that there are any conclusive objective proofs of 
God, yet, affirm the existence of God.  This alternative path that they seem to uncover – 
towards an assurance of God – is what I seek to explore: I characterize this path as an 
existential proof of God. 
In the first chapter, I shall investigate the possible incommensurability of their 
existential approaches, as suggested by Thomas Anderson, and end with a resolution of 
this tension by a reflection upon concrete experience. The second chapter will explore the 
notion of existential truth in such a way as to absolve both Kierkegaard and Marcel from 
the labels of irrationalism and subjectivism as they are sometimes imagined to be.  It will 
be also shown how Marcel’s more phenomenologically robust approach provides a more 
 v 
philosophically friendly method (in that it makes explicit some of the reasons for his 
method whereas Kierkegaard does not), which also allows for some clarification of 
Kierkegaard’s own philosophy. The third chapter provides a final reflection on the notion 
of an existential proof of God and its legitimacy, which can be found in the works of 
religious existentialists such as Kierkegaard and Marcel.  
The conclusion of this dissertation is that Kierkegaard and Marcel have opened a 
space for the possibility of a kind of religious knowledge hitherto ignored, or rather, 
given scant attention in the literature.  Furthermore, I have defended the view that this 
kind of religious knowledge amounts to what can be called an existential proof of God. In 
the end, this existential proof, admittedly, has the paradoxical nature of not being a 
conclusive proof of God (nor intending to be), but nevertheless justifying the individual’s 

































Dear Aunt Helen: 
 
 It brings me such great joy to hear from you at this time that I can hardly 
contain it, let alone describe it. The excitement of receiving your letter at this 
particular time is so overwhelming that I could almost succumb to tears. I have so 
much to share with you that I cannot decide where to begin; so I guess I will just begin 
here, where I am: basking in the sheer joy of the timing of your letter.  
 It is not simply the amount of time that we have not spoken—six years to be 
exact—that brings me joy, but the circumstances under which I have received it.  You 
see aunt Helen, I have recently been going through some profound changes and 
discoveries in my life, and as a result, I had actually begun drafting a letter for you, 
but I had not finished it. Instead, to my great surprise, you wrote to me! And not only 
had I begun to write a letter to you around the same time that your letter was on its 
way, but there were two other coincidences, which shocked me even more and 
challenged my understanding of existence to the core.   
 What first occurred was that, on the night before I received your letter, I had a 
vivid dream in which you sent me a message: a letter, in fact. And I simply thought it 
was a strange dream, and that it would be quite amusing if it were the case that you 
had in fact written; but I did not entertain this as an actually possibility. I thought it 
was quite unlikely and did not seriously consider it. But what happened next is what 
was most shocking.  
After I awoke from my bed, while I was on the way to pick up my mail some 
distance from my cabin, I saw one of your favorite creatures: A Japanese Beetle! It 
stopped in the middle of my path as to make sure that I see it. It appeared to stare at 
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me, moving its wings as if to communicate a message, and in that moment it was as if 
something inside me shifted. I felt that something quite unique was happening. So I 
stood there, silently contemplating, waiting to process the moment and receive the full 
impact of what it seemed was being communicated or revealed to me; for indeed, I felt 
as if these “coincidences” had some greater significance than the status of mere chance 
occurrences normally given to them. A few moments later, I felt as if you had just 
visited me—I felt you present, as if you were actually with me. I recalled that you 
mentioned to me that you had often dreamt of such creatures and that you felt some 
deep connection to them: that one day, after having a dream with them one night, one 
of these marvelous creatures sneaked into your car and settled upon your lap, staying 
there with you the entirety of your trip to work, making you feel as if it had flown out 
of your dreams and into your life. So, as you can imagine, when I saw this creature—
which, incredibly, I was also seeing for the first time in my life—in this unlikely part 
of the country—It was like one of these creatures had flown out of your dreams and 
into my life and path, in order to convey the message that you were indeed with me, 
that I was not alone, and that you had in fact written me a letter as my own dream 
seemed to foretell! At that moment, without effort, a certainty came over me that I 
cannot describe but only affirm, as if it were an immediate knowledge that had just 
been graced upon me, for I did not consciously choose it. And when this silvery-green 
creature finally flew away, appearing to know it had accomplished its purpose, I 
eagerly ran to check my mail and confirm what I had felt within me with the greatest 
of certainty. To the immense surprise of my eyes, though not of my heart, there it was, 
your letter!  
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 This experience in fact was the height of a month filled with what I would call 
gentle assurances from God! As you know, I had always struggled with God. I often 
despaired of not having any conclusive proof that would appease my reasoning mind, 
and thus my belief in God was frequently shaken. But with immense joy I share with 
you that with such assurances as I have received—including these, of which I now 
speak—no one could ever doubt that there is such a Being of Love within which we 
all exist, and within whom we arise? For it has been as if a symphony of events has 
conspired to bring me toward this moment of utter fulfillment—as if God Himself had 
orchestrated all the events of my life in order assure me that this was His Universe, 
and that I should not be afraid1. This is the great news that I have been so eager to 
share with you aunt Helen: that I finally believe in God again! Truly. And in a way 
that I would have never have imagined, or believed possible. That I’ve receive such 
grace as I’ve never experienced, and in such a way as to fill me with the most 
indescribable joy that I can hardly contain the tears as I write. Oh the joy! A joy that 
seems to come from beyond: a joy so unbounded as to make the worst suffering of this 
existence appear insignificant: a joy so indescribable as if to be a kiss from eternity, 
from the eternal joy that awaits us: a joy so profound that it seems to provide the hope 
that I shall never despair in this universe since it is the source of a God who is Love. 
And what is more, is that this light, which I can only conceive of as source of all 
things, has also been my guide through out my spiritual journey, for I have the sense 
that I have not been alone. I have many times felt as if I have been gently steered into 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This captures, or parallels, Marcel’s notion of hope, where hope is not conceived as believing that a 
particular outcome will not manifest (as that of friend dying of cancer for instance), but that one has an 
assurance that in the end all will turn out well: that there is a purpose to all, or that universe is in fact on 
our side and conspires for our ultimate good—though such a good may not be apparent in our current 
circumstances.   
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the things that I have discovered, like I’ve been guided by a higher principle than that 
of chance and toward the resting place in which I now reside in. And it brings me so 
much pleasure to be able to share this with you how I arrived at this new assurance of 
God’s grace and reality, and I excitedly await your thoughts on all that I’ve come to 
believe.  
   As you know well, I have always had both a philosophical and spiritual 
inclination. As a result, you and I often spoke about religious and spiritual matters in 
my childhood even though many ignored my thoughts as the silly ponderings of a 
child. Yet, even though in most of my life I have had belief in God, in my adult life, I 
have gone through many struggles with my faith and belief—as you yourself predicted 
when you also prophesied that I would one day live alone for several years—I did not 
believe you at the time, but here we are. Anyhow, my journey has been a difficult one. 
I have gone from a naïve faith, to a fervent seeking of truth, to pure agnosticism and 
skepticism, even to the depth of atheism and despair. But now, I reside in a faith that I 
feel cannot be shaken; but also, in all honesty, with no clear way in which to 
communicate it, or convey it to others. For though I have found my own way to God 
and feel as though I have proven God to myself, so to speak, I have not done so in such 
a way as to be certain that I can convince others, or to make it known to the world 
with some logically valid argument or demonstrations. But without further delay, let 
me answer your specific question as to how I have been, and share with you my long 
and difficult journey: what I have learned, and how I have arrived at this new faith in 
God.  
 6 
 As you are aware, at least in part, it all started in my teenage years. I had been 
brought up Catholic, and though not very religious in the strictest sense, I had a strong 
belief in God. In fact, I often tried to convince my friends and came up with arguments 
for the existence of God. I found myself arguing for God or arguing against arguments 
that tried to disprove God. And after learning some philosophy from you and taking 
some logic courses, it soon became my task and greatest longing to prove God 
logically, and starting from any and every perspective imaginable; for, I was certain of 
God’s existence at the time, and wanted to prove it to everyone. I strongly believed in 
God and thought my belief to be rational and thus communicable and provable to all, 
at least in principle. And through the years I came up with many arguments that were 
convincing to me, though I could never convince any of my friends, or the people that 
I had debated against. In fact, such a task ended in total disillusionment one day, 
when, to my terror, I realized not only that I could never convince this particular 
acquaintance of mine of the reality of God, but that in all honesty, I could not answer 
any of the questions and objections he posed! They were honest, sharp, and intelligent. 
I had never encountered someone like him; and for the first time in my life, I could not 
come up with any answers! I felt utterly defeated and hopeless, though I did not let 
this show in front of my friend. I could not come up with any rational arguments 
against his views, nor could I come up with my own arguments in favor of God any 
longer, for he had objected successfully to all my attempts, and I could not come up 
with any more counter-arguments. Indeed, I thought I had succeeded against other 
people in the past, especially since I thought that I had succeeded in believing in God 
on a rational basis, as every philosopher desires, but this day was different: on this 
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day, I was defeated. On this day, against my own will, I became an atheist, an 
unwilling atheist, …or one who could no longer believe in what he so desired: one 
who could not believe in God.  
 Up to this point, I had considered my self to be a rational theist, and thus, I 
believed that what I believed could be proved, at least in theory, and that what I 
believed was unquestionably rational. But for this very reason, when I could not 
defend myself rationally—when I could not find a rational basis for my belief—I had 
no support, no way to hold on to my faith, and thus, I despaired. I could no longer 
believe, and rest in the God of peace2.  
 For months, and even years, I believe, I despaired. Quietly, I despaired, 
longing to believe in a God that my intellect could grasp, or at least justify, but to no 
avail. And how do you console a heart whose source of meaning and hope has been 
stripped away with apparently no way out? I was devastated, and no one knew, for I 
hid it in the depth of my being. My friends and girlfriend at the time had no idea and 
thought all was well: but I was dying inside. I was starting to feel as if life had no 
meaning and purpose and I often thought of suicide. If there is no God, I thought, then 
there is no hope, no life, no meaning, and only death. All life seemed a perpetual 
dying at best, or a continual torture of an existence that teases us with meaning and 
purpose but leaves us empty-handed. So what is the point of being good, or even of 
living, if all will simply end in death and destruction, in complete nothingness, or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  This is reminiscent of Saint Augustine: that the experience of rest he found in God was precisely 
indicative of his Existence. This is also similar to Marcel’s notion of Ontological Exigence in which he 
suggests that our unrest is indicative of misrelating to reality in some way, or to Being, which he also 
equates with God; noting, moreover, that the filling experience in the proper awareness or relation to 
Being is also indicative of its reality. It is interesting, furthermore, that Kierkegaard might be thought to 
suggest something similar as well in his depiction of despair, where he states that the state of despair is 
not properly relating to the power that established us, i.e. to God—See Sickness Unto death.  
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absolute non-existence! If all will be destroyed and return to nothing, then why should 
we care about anything at all? Why care for anything except the pleasures of the body 
that we can cling to as a distraction from the reality of a meaningless universe, a 
pointless existence? And so, that is what I did. I indulged in the distractions of my 
friends and the city: going to dance clubs, drinking, smoking, seeking women without 
thought or much consideration for the consequences. But all the while, even among 
these distractions, if I were honest, I secretly longed for more; I still longed for 
something more than the life I was living, for meaning, and value. I simply longed for 
something higher than the emptiness of a purely materialistic existence. As I now see 
it, my heart still longed for a God.  
 The more I engaged in this lifestyle, the emptier I felt. It was as if numbness 
was taking over my body and death slowly increasing within me. All this induced, 
strangely enough, by a desperate longing for a God that I could not believe in, that I 
could not relate to, since I could no longer prove Him to exist.  
After reaching a certain low point of inner turmoil and strife, for I could not 
even sustain a stable relationship with a woman at the time, I began searching for 
inner peace in different spiritual traditions. I searched all kinds of religions and 
spiritual texts including Buddhism and Hinduism, and even within philosophy for 
some sort release from my despair. And although I found some comfort in the 
Buddhist de-centering of the self, it was only temporary. I found that there was a kind 
of dishonesty, or in-authenticity, in Buddhism’ depersonalizing of all existence, so to 
speak, in order to be rid of suffering; I found this to be dissatisfying as a solution to 
my situation. And though I embraced Hinduism for a while because of its more 
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philosophical approach to religiousness, I also found it wanting, and ultimately 
dissatisfying—I did not find their notion of the relation between God and the world 
rationally satisfying; it appeared incoherent.  
It was not until I read the Spanish existentialist Miguel de Unamuno that I 
began to regain my sense of the religiousness, and positive longing for God. At some 
point, I had recalled all the existentialists that you had once told me about: Unamuno, 
Kierkegaard, Marcel, Buber, Heidegger, and so on. I decided to begin with Unamuno, 
and my life was completely changed!  
It was not that I fully agreed with all that he espoused, but through my 
encounter with him, he filled me a courage that I had never fathomed before: the 
courage to believe! He gave me the courage through his infinite passion to believe 
beyond my understanding: beyond the limits of my thought and reason. He broke the 
shackles of my thought, of my rational mind, and my heart and mind were finally free 
and able to be reconciled with each other, and I then found myself in great joy and 
peace, for the first time in years. Because of him, I could believe in God in again! The 
God that I had lost on account of reason and logic: the God that I had longed to 
believe in but could not bring myself to it: the God whom I attempted to reach through 
the finite steps of logic and abstraction. I realized that therein laid my mistake. I had 
striven toward the infinite with the meager steps of the finite, which now seems 
obviously absurd to me, for it is a false start, a confusion in terms—since the 
difference spoken of here is of quality, not of quantity. That is what Kierkegaard and 
Unamuno perceived so well and tried to show us: that only within the infinite passion 
of a man can the eternal, God, ever be encountered, or known.  
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It was at this point, aunt Helen, that my life was completely transformed. It 
was not, of course, that I had agreed with all that he espoused, but he provided the 
catalyst for what is perhaps the greatest realization of my life. For truly, as I finished 
one reading day one his chapter from his greatest philosophical work, it was as if a 
light had shone upon me, and a new principle of truth had been revealed to me and 
confirmed within my being. For, as you know already, I struggled with not being able 
to rationally or logically prove God, for years, and yet, while Unamuno found in 
himself the same conflict between his mind and his heart, he did not hesitate in calling 
himself an irrationalist and chose to believe in God! He claimed that even though his 
intellect actually convinces him that there is no God, his heart and deepest passion as a 
man of blood and bone was that there be a God, and solely upon this basis did he 
assent to the belief in God! Against his reason he chose to believe. What courage! And 
the impact of his words was so powerful that it caused me to stop reading in order to 
contemplate his words. In a flash I realized that although I struggled with doubt and 
despaired of not having objective proof or evidence of God, I could not deny that I 
wanted God to exist, that I deeply wanted to believe. Then, I questioned, why should I 
long for God as much as I do, as I have throughout my life? This brought me to the 
sense that this experience itself was of the utmost importance, that it was indicative of 
something. And I continued to reason that certain experiences must be valuable and 
irrefutable in what they show in themselves. As this thought seeped into me, I began to 
wonder, why could this not be the proof! And, this thought did not come as a question 
but with a kind of certainty I had not felt before. Indeed, it became clear to me that my 
very desire for God was in fact the proof I was longing for, the very proof of God’s 
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presence. From that moment on, my doubts have melted away! It was as if something 
in my inner being communicated with me and revealed this truth to me, which I could 
not deny; and reason simply lost its place as the ultimate arbiter of truth, becoming 
subservient to a higher principle, which it now serves. And as I now see it, it is as if it 
has now been put in its proper place.  
 So what is the significance of all this? Well, though these explanations are a bit 
abstract, aunt Helen, I share these with you primarily because I know that if anyone 
can understand them and their existential significance, it is you. For, what has been 
illuminated for me is that our experience is in fact the most valuable and fundamental 
element in any true metaphysics, or in our exploration of Being, or more specifically 
in my case, in seeking knowledge of God. I have come to believe that we are primarily 
immersed within Being and participate in it, and thus that our primary access to it 
should be, or can only be, through experience itself, through our encounter(s) within 
it! This of course would validate and show the significance of some of our most 
profound feelings, or experiences, in our concrete life: that indeed our existence in the 
world is our most fundamental means to access reality and truth! And therefore, that 
our experience of God cannot be mediated through any rational proof, or more 
pointedly, that any rational proof could not give us knowledge of God or Being, but 
only of concepts and their relation, since the proof would have to be undertaken after 
our severance from Being, from reality, thus, remaining in pure abstraction. And if this 
is the case, it is clear that God cannot be known through these means because God 
could only be known within reality itself—i.e. through some kind of direct 
encounter—for if we detach ourselves from reality in order to reason “objectively,” 
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then we would have removed ourselves from contact with that which we are 
attempting to know, thus condemning ourselves to remain in the darkness that results 
from such an arbitrary detachment. It now seems undeniable to me that such a 
connection to reality is the necessary pre-requisite for any true knowledge of God. 
And this is most essentially what I have come realize aunt Helen, and the resultant 
peace and joy that fills me cannot be compared.  
  You see, after these insights and realization that appeared to take place within 
the depth of my being, it seems as if God wanted to confirm that my thoughts were 
correct by surrounding me with such amazing occurrences that I am almost tempted to 
call all of them miracles. I began to experience coincidences that reflected my inner 
thoughts and concerns, such that it sometimes appeared that God was answering my 
every question, so that now, though in the past I longed for proofs, the evidence 
seemed to more than abound—perhaps because I am now looking at the world with 
new eyes! I suppose you are not now as shocked with such experiences as these since 
you have always spoken to me of such apparent encounters with God, but there were 
many days and instances in which I began to pray, and, while in prayer, a question 
would arise within me, and when I opened my eyes and went to the nearest book, I 
would open up onto the pages that were addressing the very question I was asking in 
prayer. This happened to me both with scriptures, as well as other books. And though 
some could try to dismiss it as mere chance, the number of times this happened to me 
repeatedly, day after day, was incredible. There were even times that I would think of 
a particular passage, like the moment of conversion of St. Augustine in his 
confessions, and when I went to open the book, I would open it to the exact pages and 
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my eyes would fall upon the exact words that I had in mind. And truly, though 
someone could somehow bring themselves to see this from the outside as some 
random coincidence, in the context of my life—what I had just gone through in my 
search for God, my realizations, my inner experience coupled with the external 
occurrences, and so on—I experienced it as if I were being communicated to. And 
indeed, it seems to me that there was a higher principle involved in all these 
occurrences, and which I can only conceive of as calling God.  
So finally, aunt Helen, it was after my realization/conversion and all the 
subsequent experiences with God I just briefly described that I decided to write to you. 
And as I mentioned at the beginning of this letter, to my great shock, you had written 
me! It is for this reason that I was so amazed and overwhelmed with emotion that my 
heart almost felt as if it were going to burst. I cannot describe it otherwise, though I 
know that someone reading this who has not had similar experiences may find the 
expression awkward and strange, or difficult to understand, nevertheless, it is so. Now 
you understand, my dearest aunt, why I found your letter to be such a culmination to 
my spiritual journey, experience, or whatever one might call it. For it seemed to 
confirm even more firmly all that I had already begun to realize: That there was 
something about the nature of existence that was not indifferent to us, that there is 
truly a God, and that this universe, being His creation, is for us in some ultimate sense, 
though we may not always perceive its final purpose. And that we can trust that there 
are other ways of knowing than that of logical argument or analysis is evident to me 
now. I am as certain of this as I am of my own existence. My experience with you, 
aunt Helen, confirms it for me beyond a shadow of a doubt. The context of your letter, 
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the revelation of it in a dream, the coincidence of the creatures from your dreams, and 
my inner certainty as I approached the mailbox which contained your letter, all 
confirm that there are truths that can be known outside the realm of objective thought, 
but that are no less real, or certain. And that we are within Being itself, and that this 
Being is the God who is Love, is now true for me beyond all doubt. And to thank for 
this I have you, my dear aunt, and our God. 
 
With the most sincere joy and affection, 
Your Nephew,  
Antonio Busca  
 









































 Philosophers have pondered and debated the question of the existence of God 
with innumerable arguments for and against it. Indeed, there is perhaps no other topic 
over which more ink has been spilt. Nevertheless, within this immense body of 
literature, within all the variety of arguments presented for the existence of God, 
proofs have been developed which generally fall into three major categories. The 
considerable majority of arguments for the existence of God can be thought of as some 
variation of what might properly be called the traditional proofs of God: the 
Ontological Argument, the Teleological (or Design) Argument, and the Cosmological 
Argument.3 A study of these arguments would reveal that all of them proceed from the 
observation of some objective fact(s), whether purely conceptual or of our sense 
experience of the world. From these objective facts, certain premises are stated and a 
conclusion logically derived.4 In light of this, it is evident that the traditional proofs of 
God mentioned here have largely fallen within the domain of what we commonly call 
the analytic tradition. It is the goal of this dissertation, however, to explore the 
resources of the continental tradition in order to flesh out a contribution to this field of 
inquiry, which is typically approached analytically. More specifically, it will explore 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Another argument that could be added to the list is the Ethical Argument; roughly speaking, this 
argues from the fact that there are objective moral standards to the existence of God. This argument has 
become more popular only in recent times, which is why I do not include it as one of the traditional 
proofs of God, though to include it would be inconsequential to the concern of this dissertation. 
4 I will refer to such demonstrations as logical-objective proofs. 
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some religious existentialist thinkers within the continental tradition in order to 
unearth what might be called an existential proof of God, which has largely been 
ignored within the philosophical tradition as whole.5 
As a point of departure for such a goal, I will be drawing from the philosophers 
of subjectivity, Soren Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel. It is my view that these 
thinkers provided for the possibility of a kind of religious knowledge hitherto ignored 
or, at the very least, given scant attention in the literature. Even though it can generally 
be assumed that they rejected the possibility of any conclusive proof of God or that 
such proofs are appropriate, they nevertheless strongly affirmed the existence of God 
as an objective reality. I argue, however, that 1) they were neither irrational nor 
subjectivist because of this and that 2) within their philosophies, one can, in fact, find 
a space within which to talk about the knowledge of God without contradiction. It is 
on this alternative path that they seem to have uncovered an assurance of God that I 
seek to explore and which I call an existential proof of God. Consequently, this will 
entail the task of showing that, within the well-spring of the work of these two 
philosophers, we can find what would allow for the possibility of an existential truth 
outside objectivity,6 thereby making possible a kind of religious knowledge. This also 
entails, of course, demonstrating that both men had a deep affinity with each other. 
Showing this will be a secondary purpose of this dissertation. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Few philosophers have made mention of such a proof; Peter Kreeft is one of the few who has spoken 
of it to some extent. An argument closely resembling that which will be attempted here is also found in 
C. S. Lewis’s Mere Christianity: It is typically referred to as the argument from desire. One of the 
differences of this argument, however, is that Lewis attempted to make it into a formal deductive 
argument within the analytic tradition and thus, fails to go into the heart matter. He failed to go deep 
enough to unearth the true existential significance of the phenomena to which he was referring. 
6 This will be most directly addressed in Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
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Now, as can be surmised from the above, the arguments that follow attempt to 
bypass the traditional analytic methodology and attempt to provide a thoroughly 
existential approach to the question of the existence of God. As such, they face some 
peculiar difficulties, most of which I will attempt to address in this introduction 
(though some of these difficulties must inevitably be answered through the text itself). 
The most pressing of these is that, as an existential approach, the argument here does 
not allow for a conceptual point of departure from which a logical conclusion is 
progressively and systematically derived. This is especially the case given that the 
main text follows the spirit of many of the existentialist thinkers and is written in a 
literary, epistolary form.7 This, admittedly, can be a disorienting and frustrating 
endeavor both for the reader as well as for the writer; yet I find such an approach 
inevitable given the nature of the project itself or, rather, the nature of the “object.”8 
This could be especially disconcerting if the reader attempts to approach the text from 
the standpoint of an analytic methodology.9 Hence, it will prove useful to discuss in 
some detail this alternative methodology and delineate some its presuppositions in 
order to highlight the exact nature of what I am calling an existential proof of God. 
Another of the difficulties that arises is found within the title itself, in my use 
of word proof in conjunction with the notion of existentialism. Clearly, anyone faintly 
familiar with existentialism would be tempted to call the juxtaposing of the word proof 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 A full explanation for the need of this literary form is provided below in a section entitled 
Methodology. I will discuss the need of the indirect method as espoused by Kierkegaard and Marcel in 
that section.  
8 I put the word object in quotations here because part of the need for the existential approach espoused 
here is that God is, in fact, not an object at all, but a subject and hence, cannot be treated as an object, 
whether conceptual or experiential.   
9 This does not mean, however, that some presuppositions or assumptions are not made and argued for; 
surely, I will attempt to ground the concrete-existential approach I have adopted in this introduction. 
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with the term existentialism an oxymoron. I am fully aware of this, for anything with 
the word “proof” smells too much of the spirit of abstraction from which 
existentialists have famously and vehemently revolted. The first point of clarification 
to be made here is that the term “existential” is precisely meant to indicate a shift in 
the use of the word “proof.” Indeed, the word is used as a qualifying term; that is, the 
term “existential” is meant to give a new color to the word “proof.” In typical 
Marcelian style this will allow us to re-evaluate these terms freshly, which will 
perhaps yield new insights to us.10 Hence, it is evident that I will be using the term 
“proof” in a qualified sense which shall become clearer later. This issue, however, will 
be most appropriately addressed by the content of the work itself, for it is precisely 
one of the issues with which this dissertation attempts to grapple. 
Finally, before proceeding to clarify the nature of my approach, it will be 
useful to be as clear as possible with respect to my intended goal. Most succinctly, it is 
the central concern of this dissertation to elucidate and explore how one might 
approach the question of God’s reality without recourse to the traditional objective 
approaches, that is, analytic proofs or demonstrations. I am attempting to explore the 
possibility of a kind of knowledge of God that is outside of what I will call objective 
knowledge, the realm of objectivity. This will thus entail a re-valuation of the notion 
of proof itself (as already mentioned), for, as has been made clear, my use of the term 
will transcend that of convention.  
 
Origin and Significance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Granted, there may still remain some tension between the notion of knowledge and proof and an 
existential approach, but I take this very tension to be useful to my goal.     
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In order to distinguish clearly the existential approach in this dissertation from 
an analytic one, it will be useful to consider the origin of this project, for its beginning, 
like the work of many existentialists, was spawned in response to an analytic 
methodology as a revolt against what has been called “the spirit of abstraction.”11 That 
is, the idea for this project arose out the awareness of a kind of inadequacy of an 
analytic approach to the existence of God as exemplified in the book Divine 
Hiddenness and Human Reason, by J. L. Schellenberg.12 
In his book, Schellenberg argued against the existence of God in typical 
analytic fashion. A brief reconstruction of his argument goes as follows: 
1) If there is God, He must be a perfectly loving13 God. 
2) If a loving God exists, then reasonable non-belief should not occur. 
3) But there is reasonable non-belief in the world. 
4) Therefore, God must not exist.14 
His view was essentially that the lack of evidence for God “is not a sign that God is 
hidden, it is a revelation that God does not exist.”15 Although many attempts have 
been made to respond to this argument, few have tapped into the vast resources of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Gabriel Marcel, Man Against Mass Society, trans. G. S. Fraser (Chicago: Regnery, 1952), 1. 
12 I have had the privilege of taking a course in the Philosophy of Religion with William Rowe at 
Purdue University. It was here that Schellenberge’s work was studied in depth and where the idea for 
this dissertation was born. 
13 Of course, Schellenberg defended the assumption of this first premise that God is perfect early in his 
book. Part of his defense was essentially to explain that he was attempting to refute the traditional 
orthodox Judeo-Christian God, which characterizes God in such a manner. Other support is also given, 
however, it should be noted that it is not the goal of this project to directly refute this analytic argument 
or any other; the intention is to undermine the analytic approach as a whole and to illustrate its 
alternative, that is, an existential approach. 
14 For a full discussion of Schellenberg’s argument, see J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and 
Human Reason (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993). 
15 Ibid., 1. 
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continental tradition to do so. One of the few who has made such an attempt is M. 
Jamie Ferreira in her essay, “A Kierkegaardian view of Hiddenness.” Schellenberg 
attempted in his book to refute a Kierkegaardian account of hiddnenness found in the 
writings of Johannes Climacus.16 Ferreira’s essay seriously challenged his attempt. 
She argued, 
Schellenberg’s examinations of Climacus’s rebuttal. . . . does not address what lies 
at the heart of Climacus’s account of hiddenness. Schellenberg reads Climacus as 
making divine hiddenness a psychological requirement for the exercise of passion.     
. . . I suggest, on the contrary, that Climacus is speaking not about a psychological 
all or nothing, but rather about a grammatical requirement—namely, that divine 
hiddenness is logically implied in the notion of God’s absoluteness.17 
 
Ferreira suggested that Schellenberg did not understand that for Kierkegaard, 
hiddenness was not a psychological requirement but, given His nature, that is, His 
“absoluteness,” a precondition for the God-relation. Put differently, God’s 
“absoluteness,” as she explained, means that knowledge of God would require a 
different means than that of objective revelation. It is in this way that Ferreira opened 
up the realm of a non-objective inquiry that can be used in response to the problem of 
hiddenness, as well. 
Hence, as we have seen, Ferreira undermined Schellenberg’s argument by 
challenging his approach and showed that a proper approach to God might, in fact, 
require a non-objective methodology. This brief discussion of her response to 
Schellenberg helps to situate the nature and impetus of this project. In other words, 
this dissertation can, in some sense, be viewed as a more substantive account of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This is one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. 
17 M. Jamie Ferreira, “A Kierkegaardian View of Divine Hiddenness,” in Divine Hiddenness: New 
Essays, ed. Daniel Howard-Snyder and Paul K. Moser (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 
169. 
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Ferreira’s response to Schellenberg, or rather, an off-shoot of it. In her response to 
Schellenberg, Ferreira only pointed out what his mistake was; she only hinted at a 
possible alternative. However, it is this alternative, a non-objective approach to the 
question, that I seek to explore and develop in the following pages and it is to this end 
that I shall rely upon Kierkegaard and Marcel. The approach that I have chosen in this 
dissertation attempts to do just that. It should be noted, however, that I do not intend to 
respond directly to Schellenberg’s argument; I intend to open the door toward a 
response, though I do not wish to address it directly.  
The secondary purpose of speaking of this argument in relation to my approach 
is simply to contrast and be clear as to what I will not be attempting. For instance, 
what is most evident from the above argument is its formal structure. Schellenberg 
shaped his argument as a formal one with premises that are intended to follow from 
one another and logically lead to its conclusion. His argument began with a certain 
premise from which all the rest were derived. The initial premise was that the 
traditional notion of God entailed that God be “perfectly loving.” Schellenberg, of 
course, went some way to defend this first premise, but this is beyond the scope of this 
project. What is to be noted is the general approach undertaken; it is a logical-
objective approach which deals with objective phenomena (i.e. phenomena observable 
by all), as mentioned above. 
Another upshot for making this difference of approach explicit is that it helps 
to highlight the significance of this project itself. It is not only intended to be a work 
that contributes to the continental tradition under which existentialism is typically 
placed, but it also intends to open a small door to more open dialogue among the 
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traditions. My sentiment is similar to that expressed by Brendan Sweetman in the 
following passage: 
There has been a notable, and I would say regrettable, absence of dialogue 
between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy in the twentieth century). 
Since I believe the Marcelian existentialist approach can throw new light on some 
of the philosophical problems that concern contemporary analytic philosophy, it is 
imperative in my view that dialogue between the two traditions be established. 
This study in general is intended to be a small gesture in that direction.18  
 
I believe that more dialogue should indeed occur among philosophers within these two 
traditions. Yet, while Sweetman attempted to take from the resources of the 
continental tradition—mainly from Marcel—in order to deal with some typically 
analytic themes in an analytic fashion (at least in its systematic presentation and mode 
of dealing with the questions), I am bridging these traditions by attempting to deal 
with a typically analytic issue in mostly a continental/existential fashion. As 
mentioned earlier, it has not been the concern of philosophers in the continental 
tradition to deal with the question of proofs for the existence of God, since they have 
largely seen it as contrary to their philosophical perspectives. I, however, try to carve a 
middle ground for such a discussion. In short, I believe that within existentialism lies 
an answer to some of the difficulties that arise within the analytical tradition with 
respect to knowledge of God, but I explore such an answer by remaining mostly 
rooted within the continental tradition in both content and style. 
 
Why Kierkegaard and Marcel? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Brendan Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel, Value Inquiry Book Series 193 (New York: 
Rodopi, 2008), 4. 
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 Upon some reflection, some might wonder if my attempt to use Kierkegaard 
and Marcel is not misguided, given that they seem to have distinct approaches to the 
question of God’s existence. My response to this issue is dealt with in chapter one 
where I essentially argue that they are not as far apart as it might initially appear. At 
this point, however, I believe it is useful to provide a general response to the question 
as to why I have chosen these two thinkers, of whom some might say are opposed in 
their approach to God. 
 The most evident point of contact between Kierkegaard and Marcel, and 
subsequently the central reason for my use of them, is their attack upon objectivity. 
They poignantly attacked objectivity, suggesting that it abstracted from existence and 
bypassed what is most essential. Indeed, the concern Kierkegaard raised most 
forcefully is whether objective thought reached its limit precisely where it was most 
important, that is, within the ethical and the religious spheres. Kierkegaard, perhaps 
more than Marcel, rejected any attempt to prove the existence of God through 
demonstration; It could even be said that for him a proof for or against God was 
useless, since it was merely dealing with abstractions, which had nothing to do with 
the reality of God.19 It should also be noted that God was a Subject for Kierkegaard, 
which meant that He was not an object in the world. Thus, he could not be proven to 
exist in the same way that one would go about proving that a certain planet exists in a 
far-off Galaxy. In light of this, we can begin to see more clearly why Kierkegaard 
would dismiss the above approach to the question of God’s existence.20  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 See. Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 2 vols., trans. Howard V. Hong and 
Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 334. 
20 I am here referring specifically to Schellenberg’s approach above, though it is against God’s 
existence, but also to any analytic approach similar to that of Schellenberg.   
 25 
 For similar reasons, Marcel also did not place much weight on attempts to 
prove the existence of God, but his reasons differed slightly. In addition to what has 
been said, Marcel also emphasized not so much that the proofs for the existence of 
God fail, but that they, although valid, did not succeed in accomplishing their task. In 
other words, he believed that if we think of what it means to prove something, we see 
that a proof’s original purpose is to persuade another to a position he did not 
previously hold; however, it is precisely in this way that the traditional proofs of God 
fail. According to Marcel, the way in which a believer comes to believe in God is not 
by way of demonstration or analytic proof, but by another route, which again, as in 
Kierkegaard, renders conceptual proofs unnecessary and inadequate.  
 It is at this point, however, that an important question arises. If we grant to 
Kierkegaard and Marcel that the reality of God cannot be proven by objective means 
and that demonstrations are useless, then can we ever be assured of the existence of 
God? Are we left only with subjective assertions that hold no objective reality? 
Marcel’s response is essentially to challenge directly this all-or-nothing dilemma of 
the question itself. In other words, he puts into question whether our options are really 
only those of either pure subjectivity or objective knowledge. With respect to this 
dilemma, he writes, “I am convinced that this ‘dilemma’ misses the essentials of 
religious life and of the most profound metaphysical thinking.”21 Thus, with this 
statement, we can begin to see that Marcel opened up a space that is neither purely 
subjective nor purely objective and that it is in this realm that God may be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 See Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal, trans. Bernard Wall (London, England: Rockliff Press, 
1952). 
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encountered. It is in this realm, which objective thought cannot reach, that the hidden 
God of Schellenberg mentioned above can be revealed. 
 In a similar vein, in my reading of Kierkegaard, his response was also an 
attempt to tread a fine line between the objective and the purely subjective. Initially, 
his definition of truth, which he also equated with faith, seemed to be the perfect 
antithesis to objectivity—for he stated that religious truth is “an objective uncertainty 
held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness.” Then, however, 
he also stated that this is “the highest truth there is for an existing person,” which in 
itself begins to suggest that he was condoning neither subjectivism nor relativism per 
se. He was simply pointing out a certain aspect of our human condition: Because we 
are finite, existing, human beings in the process of becoming, the highest truth 
(“knowledge”) we can reach with respect to the religious is not to be found in the 
objective realm, but within subjectivity itself, or subjective appropriation, as 
Kierkegaard sometimes put it. Kierkegaard, through Climacus, suggested that, 
objectively, religious questions emphasize what is believed, that is, the thought 
content. But subjectively, the emphasis is on the how of the belief, which means that 
the emphasis is on the relation itself and not on the object of belief. The question is 
whether the relation itself is one of truth. He claimed that subjectively, the truth is 
precisely the how of belief, that the inward, infinite passion itself in our relation to 
God is the truth. It is in view of this that Kierkegaard was able to claim that 
Christianity is not a doctrine, which is thought content, but a way of being; it is the 





Methodology: Content and Form 
The above discussion naturally brings us squarely into the issue of an existential 
methodology. In the above, I have supported my use of Kierkegaard and Marcel based 
upon their rejection of objective approaches to God, but we have still not clarified the 
exact nature of an existential approach or what it entails. It is the aim of this section to 
clarify the existential approach I intend to employ and the reason for its necessity.  
To be clear on the issue of methodology, it will be helpful to clarify the term 
existentialism itself. First and foremost, the notion of existentialism that will be used 
here is most directly derived from that of Marcel’s notion of it, which I also take to be 
that of Kierkegaard,22 generally speaking. Put most succinctly, an existentialist is one 
who begins his philosophy with and gives ontological priority to the experience of the 
existing individual subject and to his concrete experience in the world in which he 
lives. In light of this and in light of what we have mentioned earlier with respect to the 
possibility of knowledge outside of objectivity, it makes sense that Marcel and 
Kierkegaard would have non-objective and non-systematic approaches. More 
specifically, what justifies their philosophical style is their observation that an 
objective approach misses much of the most significant experiences of our lives in the 
world and that it is essentially impossible to separate content from form given that 
which they are trying to illuminate. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Of course, it is well known that neither thinker called himself existentialist, but by the nature of their 
thought and the commonality of their interest, I take it safe to categorize them as such. Many attempts 
have been made to define existentialism and who belongs to such a group, which is why I have thought 
it necessary to define the notion of existentialism that I will be working with and it is one that is most in 
line with the thought of Marcel and Kierkegaard.   
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In Kierkegaard we see clearly this inseparability of content and form and how 
it affected his style of philosophizing in the following passage: 
Whereas the objective thinker can perfectly well communicate directly the result 
of his own reflection, “the subjective existing thinker” discovers an impediment to 
communication in the further reflection that the truth he arrives at “interests” his 
existence (is part and parcel of it) and as such cannot simply be handed over to 
another, but to be appropriated, to becomes one’s own, it must be acquired 
through the same process of reflection by which it was originally reached. Hence 
the communication must be indirect, artfully devised to prompt the other to think 
out the thing for himself, while the subjectivity of the communicator remains 
concealed.23  
 
Here, it is clear that, for Kierekegaard, the form and content could be separated from 
that which is being explored; this is because the form, in some sense, is the content 
itself. This means, in reality, that the “truth” of that which is being sought—that is, 
God, in this case—cannot be found apart from the mode of seeking; the mode of 
seeking is supposed to be a subjective one since that which is being communicated 
was found through subjective means and as Kierkegaard put it, for this very reason, 
must be sought through the same process it was discovered (i.e. subjectively). More 
specifically, the reason this truth must be sought and discovered subjectively is 
because its nature is such that it has an intimate relation to the individual and can thus 
be revealed only through his/her own existence. In still other words, the truth 
attempted to be communicated is intimately tied to the individual existence of the 
communicator, and can thus only be communicated indirectly, “artfully,” in such a 
way that it may prompt the “receiving” party to search her own existence and thereby 
come to realize this truth within her own life; as Kierkegaard suggested, it is a truth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Søren Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), 117.  
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that “interests” the individual’s existence itself (and is “part and parcel of it”) and can 
thus only be known by one who is not indifferent to his own existence as it might be 
said that an objective thinker is bound to be (by the very nature of his approach). 
 
Terminology: Subjectivity, Objectivity, Knowledge 
For the sake of clarity, it will be useful to address briefly some terminological 
concerns. In the discussion above, much has been said of objective versus subjective 
approaches. In light of this, it seems appropriate to discuss the meaning of these terms.  
Given that I find that Kierkegaard and Marcel had similar uses of these terms, I 
will employ them in a similar fashion. Not surprisingly, objectivity has to do with the 
approach to the world that places the subject as a detached observer that is separate 
from the observed such as in the Cartesian approach. In Kierkegaard, this approach is 
many times associated with speculative philosophy, or the historical as he also put it. 
In Marcel, moreover, we see that objectivity is viewed as associated with the world of 
science and technology, as well, which heavily relies upon the subject-object 
dichotomy just mentioned. In essence, it is apparent that the essential feature of 
objectivity is to be indifferent to the reality of the subject in order to be “objective” in 
one’s approach: at least, this is what is typically implied. Truly, the subject is 
irrelevant to an objective approach. Thus, when I speak of objectivity, the objective 
realm, or objective knowledge, they can generally be interpreted as relating to the 
world of science, material objects, mathematics, and the phenomenal world as a 
whole.  
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On the other hand, subjectivity has to do with all that involves the subject in 
his concreteness existence. It is, in a sense, the opposite of the realm of objectivity as 
presented above. Objectivity has to do with the external world of the verifiable, 
whereas subjectivity has to do with the intimate world of the subject and his individual 
relation to the world. I will view subjectivity as all that constitutes the world of the 
concrete individual in the world, including all her desires, her willing, her actions, 
beliefs, and emotions, in short, the full range of her experiences in the world. Note, 
moreover, that what characterizes subjectivity as opposed to objectivity is essentially 
that what is involved in subjectivity is generally unverifiable by an outside observer. 
The world of the subject is solely her own.  
Now, in the context of these definitions, we can clarify some ambiguities that 
might arise in the use of the term knowledge in what follows. The obvious difficulty is 
that, in my claim to the possibility of a kind of religious knowledge of God through a 
subjective approach, the term knowledge itself seems to suggest objectivity. Thus, 
although Kierkegaard and Marcel were against objectivity as defined above, how can I 
use their subjective approaches in order to arrive at a kind of objective knowledge? 
Are we not engaged in circular reasoning? To avoid this confusion, I propose, for the 
purposes of this paper, to retain the dichotomy of the objective versus the subjective. 
On the other hand, I suggest that a distinction must be made between what is 
objectively true/real and what can be objectively known (verified)—what is 
objectively known is what can be known through any objective method. In other 
words, the distinction allows us to speak of something capable of being objectively 
true or of being an objective reality and yet not be objectively knowable or verifiable. 
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Put differently, what we are doing is using the word objective in two slightly different 
ways. In one sense, we are using it to emphasize the fact that the reality of something 
is independent of the subjective opinion of individuals; in another sense, we are using 
it to emphasize the fact that it is knowable within the world of objectivity—the 
objective realm as we have defined it. With this distinction in mind, we can now speak 
of something that is not objectively knowable, but that is nevertheless objectively real, 
that is, true. Granting that, we can then relate this to the reality of God. We can more 
easily understand the claim that, even though God cannot be known objectively or 
proven, He can still be known to be objectively real through subjective means, which 
is what I have called an existential approach/proof. 
 
Conclusion 
In the above, I have illustrated and explained what I take to be Kierkegaard’s 
and Marcel’s existential approach to God and how they open a path for a kind of 
religious knowledge. In the first chapter, I shall investigate the possible 
incommensurability of these two philosophers’ existential approaches, as suggested by 
Thomas Anderson. The second chapter will explore and develop the notion of 
existential truth in such a way as to absolve both Kierkegaard and Marcel from the 
labels of irrationalism and subjectivism, which are sometimes attached to their 
philosophies. I shall also show how Marcel’s more phenomenologically robust 
approach provides a more philosophically friendly method, in the sense that it makes 
more explicit some of the reasons for his method (whereas Kierkegaard does not), 
which allows for some clarification of Kierkegaard’s own philosophy. The third 
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chapter provides a final reflection on the notion of an existential proof of God and its 
legitimacy; this is where the main objections to such an approach are directly 
addressed.  
In the end, the conclusion of this dissertation is that Kierkegaard and Marcel 
have provided sufficient basis for the possibility of a kind of religious knowledge 
hitherto ignored, or rather given scant attention in the literature. Further, I have 
defended the view that this kind of religious knowledge amounts to what can be called 
an existential proof of God. Finally, it should be noted that although this existential 
proof admittedly has the paradoxical nature of not being a conclusive proof of God 
(nor intending to be one), it nevertheless justifies the individual’s belief in God in and 


























CHAPTER 1: MAN’S JOURNEY TOWARD GOD: 













The goal of this essay is to provide further reflection on the relation between 
Kierkegaard and Marcel’s approach to God and to undertake a more detailed analysis 
of their supposed opposition since not enough clarity has been reached with respect to 
this issue, neither in our text nor in philosophical literature as a whole. Now, although 
scholarship on their relation is scant, there are some who have dealt with the issue, but 
have done so only cursorily, and have generally ended with an emphasis upon 
differences, rather than on commonalities. One such scholar is Thomas Anderson. He 
essentially suggested that their philosophies were mutually exclusive.24 His article, 
“The Experiential Paths to God in Kierkegaard and Marcel,” concluded with the 
statement, “I suspect that the two paths are fundamentally irreconcilable.”25 However, 
though an ecumenical interpretation of Kierkegaard and Marcel is rejected by him, I 
will defend the view that their differences are typically misunderstood, exaggerated, or 
both, and that his view of mutually exclusivity is at the very least not well founded, if 
not a blatant misunderstanding of the relation between the two.26 
 It is not my intention, however, to misrepresent professor Anderson by 
rendering his work as merely emphasizing their differences. On the contrary, his essay 
is an excellent summary and comparison of their respective philosophies; he does, in 
fact, outline the many ways in which Kierkegaard and Marcel were in agreement. Here 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Thomas C. Anderson, “The Experiential Paths to God in Kierkegaard and Marcel,” Philosophy Today 
26 (Spring 1982). 
25 Ibid.   
26 I am aware that even Marcel attempted to distinguish himself from Kierkegaard, yet I believe his 
criticism of Kierkegaard was also based upon a misinterpretation, hence, my contention is also against 
Marcel’s own view. I hold that their differences lay elsewhere and that they are not substantial.  
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is a brief summary or their agreement according to Anderson: (a) they both hold the 
view that we are generally in a condition of despair or brokenness, (b) this brokenness 
or despair is remedied by a re-establishment of the proper relation or connection to the 
ground of our Being, that is, to God, and (c) that this restoring of our relation to Being, 
or God, must occur by a kind of surrender of ourselves to this higher, transcendent 
reality; in other words, we must surrender and realize that we do not belong to 
ourselves, as Marcel would put it, and that we are nothing or are to become nothing 
before God (i.e. surrender), à la Kierkegaard, and this is how we properly, or truly, 
relate to God in order to remedy despair, and ultimately d) our brokenness can only be 
healed by and through God, that is, the healing or restoration is achieved only by 
grace, and not by our own power. Indeed, for receiving such a remedy there is no 
clear-cut or “fool proof” plan of action, except through openness, a surrender, or 
receptivity on our part. In the end, it is a gift and both Kierkegaard and Marcel 
recognized this and responded to it by attempting to make others receptive to such 
grace, since that is all that can be done at this level. 
 However, the challenge still remains for Anderson, for even though we could 
generally accept their agreement with respect to certain aspects of our fundamental 
condition in the world, the way we are ultimately to receive the gift of God that 
remedies our despair or brokenness is quite different. For instance, one seemed to 
recommend solitude and inward passion in relation to God, or the eternal, and the 
other seemed to suggest that adequate access to God is through a proper relation and 
openness to the other and that in this communion with others, we find our way back to 
God—or re-establish our rooted-ness in Being. One also seemed to emphasize pure 
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passion, seemingly against reason, while the other seemed friendly toward using our 
intellect or reason to come to God. Finally, while one seemed to view God as utterly 
transcendent and far from contact with man except by grace, the other seemed to view 
God as immanent and extremely close to man, almost indistinguishably. These, in fact, 
could be seen as the central issues upon which Anderson based his claim of their 
incompatibility.  
In response to this, my mode of approach will be to divide my response into 
four parts and address each of these three claims, the first part being a preliminary 
commentary on the source of the misunderstanding. The sections will be titled as 
follows: 1) The Misunderstanding, 2) The Individual vs. Community, 3) Faith vs. 
Reason, and 4) Transcendence vs. Immanence. In section (1), I will highlight a main 
source of the misunderstanding, which I take to be two fold: first, a lack of 
consideration of the signed text of Kierkegaard, and second, not taking seriously 
enough their intended goals as each of them envisioned. In section (2), I will proceed 
to show how Kierkegaard and Marcel are not so clearly at odds with respect to 
whether we should relate to God individually or through the other (i.e. the 
community). Section (3) will illustrate how their use of reason in our approach to God 
is also not as distant as it might first appear and section (4) will show that 
Kierkegaard’s God is not so transcendent as to be incompatible with that of Marcel’s 
God, and vice versa. Finally, the goal will be to show that in each case they are not as 
far apart as they may appear and that in the end, one need not necessarily choose 
between being either a Kierkegaardian or a Marcelian, but that one could adhere to 
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both. Hence, we would have shown that they are not mutually exclusive (i.e. 
incompatible) in their respective philosophies. 
The Misunderstanding 
When reading Kierkegaard’s texts, especially his pseudonymous works, it is 
easy to misunderstand him since his corpus is full of subtle distinctions, layers of 
meaning, and sometimes, hidden agendas. Surely, one can easily get lost in attempting 
to discover what Kierkegaard himself held to be true, especially considering that he 
was intentionally indirect (and even obscure) with his views and also warned the 
reader that he should not read his pseudonyms as if they were speaking on his behalf. 
He requested that we quote the pseudonyms instead of him when referencing passages 
from their texts. All of this was simply to show that it is, indeed, not always easy to 
discern Kierkegaard’s true meaning or views and that misunderstandings were liable 
to happen because of his style, as well as his intentions. As a result, in interpreting 
Kierkegaard, it is important to consider his corpus as whole, by which I mean that his 
signed works should also be considered in understanding his philosophy for much of 
the misunderstanding of Kierkegaard is clearly from our taking what his pseudonyms 
express at face value and sometimes attributing those views to him, instead of viewing 
the context and intention with which it is said. Hence, it is my intention to consider 
some of his signed works, especially Works of Love,27 as well some of his journal 
entries, in order to make it easier to discern his true views and intentions. For instance, 
if we consider WOL, it becomes quite obvious that many of the usual criticisms 
hauled against Kierkegaard (some of which I will address below) completely miss the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 From now on this will be abbreviated as WOL. 
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mark, for there we see that he expressed his true views more clearly and directly.28 
Again, the main point is that upon a closer examination of his entire corpus, it can be 
seen that many of the views commonly attributed to him and that appear to get him 
into trouble are gross misunderstandings of him.  
A related cause to what I take to be Anderson’s erroneous depiction of the 
relation between Kierkegaard and Marcel, which arises out of the above as well, is not 
keeping in mind the intentions or overall views of their own philosophies, including 
not taking seriously enough certain important distinctions each made that are relevant 
for understanding their philosophies as whole. To be more specific, it is well known 
that Kierkegaard was a Lutheran Christian addressing himself to his intellectual 
contemporaries, but who were mainly Christian. As a result, we know that 
Kierkegaard was a Christian author from the beginning and was not addressing a 
purely secular philosophical community for philosophical purposes, as Marcel was. 
His purpose was simple and clear. As he himself expresses it, he was attempting to 
make true Christians out of Christendom. He believed that many of the Christians of 
his time, largely because of the influence of philosophy and particularly Hegelianism, 
lost the true sense of what it means to be a Christian and to be a person of faith. Thus, 
all of his authorship revolved around this idea: what does it mean to be an existing 
human being in the world and have faith, especially Christian faith. Even in his 
earliest work, E/O, he expressed that his goal was to seduce people into the religious. 
At the same time, however, Kierkegaard’s account of religiousness was quite nuanced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 Of course some might disagree 
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and he spoke of different kinds or levels of religiousness. In the CUP,29 for instance, 
he stated that there were two general kinds of religiousness: religiousness A and 
religiousness B, which I shall discuss in more detail later. Religiousness B, for him, 
was pure Christianity. Religiousness A, on the other hand, was a more general form of 
religiousness, which he sometimes described as immanent religiousness; here, a 
person need not relate himself to a specific religion, but merely yoke himself with the 
passion of infinity to an eternal joy, found in God, and nothing else. There are, of 
course, different levels and forms of religiousness A, but this is irrelevant to our 
concern here. It is enough for our purposes to recognize that Kierkegaard conceived of 
the possibility of religiousness of two kinds, a general religious sensitivity that anyone 
can have, and who need not belong to any specific organization, and then a more 
specific kind of religiousness, which was, for him, Christianity. Now, of course, from 
what has been said, we are well aware that Kierkegaard’s central interest was 
Christian religiousness from the start, and so, he evidently discussed religiousness A 
as a necessary step, toward Christianity. However, what is the significance of this 
distinction that Kierkegaard made between different kinds of religiousness? Simply, 
that if we keep in mind that Kierkegaard strictly focused upon Christianity and Marcel 
did not, then this can clearly reveal why they seemed to be contradicting one another 
in many places and why Anderson, as well as others, could easily misunderstand their 
supposed discord. 
Thus, can it be shown that Marcel was focused upon the non-Christian 
religiousness while Kierkegaard is focused upon the Christian? Indeed. Marcel, in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Concluding Unscientific Postscript 
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fact, made almost the exact distinction Kierkegaard made: between a generally 
religious person (who does not conform to any particular religion) and a religious 
person who adheres to a specific religion or doctrine. Moreover, he stated not only that 
he would focus upon the generally religious, but also that for the latter, no 
philosophical reflection is possible. What is more, even Anderson himself wrote in his 
book on Marcel that he was concerned with the former in his philosophical analysis 
and that the latter—the specifically religious person, such as the Christian—is outside 
of the scope of philosophy altogether, being extremely personal. Anderson made the 
observation in the following passage: 
Marcel also makes a very important distinction between two types of faith, of 
revelation, and of religion. One refers to God or revelation in general which can be 
present in someone who is not a participant in any particular religious tradition but 
is, in his terminology, “naturally religious.” The other, faith or revelation strictly 
speaking, contains specific beliefs in the God and revelation present in particular 
historical religions, churches, creeds, sacred texts, doctrines and so forth. That 
kind of faith is not attainable by human power, but requires a personal conversion 
dependent on God’s grace. The former, religious faith and revelation in general, is 
within the scope of philosophy for it involves natural religious experience that any 
human being may have.30 
 
It is absolutely clear from this passage that Marcel not only decided to focus on the 
“naturally religious,” but also believed that special revelation was outside the scope of 
philosophy, so that his philosophy was assuredly not, strictly speaking, a Christian 
philosophy. However, if it is the case that Marcel was expressly focused in his 
philosophy on the kind of religiousness in people that is not specifically Christian 
while Kierkegaard was expressly concerned with Christianity and bringing people 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Thomas C. Anderson, A Commentary on Gabriel Marcel’s The Mystery of Being (Milwaukee, WI: 
Marquette University Press, 2006), 189. 
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toward a religious transformation to it, then it stands to reason that this should be the 
cause of some significant differences in their form of expression, and most 
importantly, their focus and emphasis. It is my view, then, that differences between 
Kierkegaard and Marcel, as outlined by Anderson, can be reconciled if the above 
distinctions and observation are kept in mind. Hence, as we shall see, the observation 
made here will be a common thread throughout that will help explain why they may 
appear to contradict themselves, when, in fact, they do not. 
 
Individual vs. Community 
One of the most central objections to their compatibility is surely that Marcel’s 
approach seems to be based purely upon inter-subjectivity and community, while 
Kierkegaard’s seems to emphasize the individual and his absolute relation to God. One 
approach to God appears to be through community and our relation to others, while 
the other seems solely concerned with inwardness or the individual’s inward and 
absolute relation to God in solitude.  
Now, of course, it must be admitted that Kierkegaard does seem to suggest at 
times that our approach to God is prior to our relation to others31 even in WOL, which 
I take to be one of his clearest accounts of our relation to others. There he stated, 
Love is a passion of the emotions, but in this emotion a person, even before he 
relates to the object of love, should first relate to God thereby learn the 
requirement, that love is the fulfilling of the Law. Love is a relationship to another 
person or to other persons, but it is by no means and may by no means be a 
marital, a friendly, a merely human agreement, a coterie of people, be it ever so 
loyal and tender! Each one individually, before he relates himself to the beloved, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 I take this priority, however, to be, in reality, an ontological priority and not a successive priority.  
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the friend, the loved ones, the contemporaries, must first relate to God and to 
God’s requirement.32 
 
However, although Kierkegaard emphasized the individual and his relation to God as 
primary and seems to by-pass the other, this is only apparent. If we read in context and 
consider other passages, his true meaning becomes clearer. Indeed, if one thoroughly 
considers some of his own texts, including WOL, one can see past the illusion of a 
purely individualistic Kierkegaard and see his communitarian spirit that is comparable 
to Marcel’s. Consider the following passage from one of Kierkegaard’s journal: 
Despite everything people ought to have learned about my maieutic carefulness, 
by proceeding slowly and continually letting it seem as if I knew nothing more, not 
the next thing—now on the occasion of my new up-building discourses [Up-
building Discourses in Various Spirits] they will probably bawl out that I do not 
know what comes next, that I know nothing about sociality. Now I have the theme 
of the next book. It will be called Works of Love.33 
 
Here we clearly see that Kierkegaard never intended to merely focus on the individual 
to the exclusion of the other, but that his reason for doing so was due to his initial 
purpose; to guide people, especially intellectuals, back into the religious sphere, and 
specifically, to Christianity. After having done that in his pseudonymous works, he 
was now in the proper position to explore and explain his notion of a Christian 
community or of our relation to others.  
 Now, let us look at passages that clarify his view of the other/neighbor in 
WOL. He stated, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Søren Kierkegaard, Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1980), 112. 
33	  Soren Kierkegaard, “Early Journal Entries”, in The Essential Kierkegaard, transl. and edited by 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton University Press, 2000), 5.  
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No, Christianity has begun from the foundation and therefore with the Spirit’s 
doctrine of what love is. In order to determine what love is, it begins either with 
God or with the neighbor, a doctrine about love that is the essentially Christian 
doctrine, since one, in order in love to find the neighbor, must start from God and 
must find God in love to the neighbor.34 
 
It is evident in this passage that our love for God does not exclude the neighbor, but 
instead that they are mutually inclusive. That is, one cannot have one without the other 
and hence, one can indeed love God by loving one’s neighbor, which is far from 
ignoring the neighbor, as some believe Kierkegaard did. In the following passage, we 
also see Kierkegaard suggested that one is, in fact, deluding herself if she thinks that 
she can relate to God without relating to the neighbor or the other:  
Such a thing can only occur only either to a hypocrite and a deceiver, in order to 
find an escape, or to someone who misrepresents God, as if God were envious of 
himself and of being loved, instead of the blessed God’s being merciful and 
therefore continually pointing away from himself, so to speak, and saying, “If you 
want to love me, then love the people you see; what you do for them, you do for 
me.” God is too exalted to be able to receive a person’s love directly.”35 
 
Hence, it cannot be claimed after reading this passage that Kierkegaard was purely 
concerned with our relation to God, pure and simple, since he suggested that to love 
God, we must indeed start by loving the neighbor, which seems to be the opposite of 
what was initially suggested. Indeed, if this passage alone is not enough to grasp 
Kierkegaard’s meaning, it should be kept in mind that he expressed this thought in the 
context of quoting, and being in accord, with the following Biblical text. “How can he 
who does not love his brother, whom he has seen, love God, whom he has not seen.” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 140. 
35 Ibid., 160. 
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In such a context, it is clear that Kierkegaard was suggesting that one must love the 
neighbor whom he sees in order to be able to love God, which is surely the opposite of 
our typical understanding of Kierkegaard as advocating a solitary relation to God, pure 
and simple. It is evident from what has been said that this is not the case and that his 
apparent emphasis on the individual’s relation to God must have a distinct purpose 
other than to exclude the importance and necessity of our relation to others, since he 
clearly suggested that our relation to God does not and should not exclude the other, 
but include it, for he even stated, “In the Christian sense, to love people is to love God, 
and to love God is to love people”36. Indeed, it cannot be clearer that for Kierkegaard, 
our relation to God and to others cannot be separated. As a result, it begins to become 
evident that he is not as far apart from Marcel as many may believe him to be.  
  In Marcel, moreover, we have a similar confusion, but from the opposite end. 
Marcel, it is thought, contrary to Kierkegaard, seemed to focus purely on the 
community and our relation to others in our approach to God. One surely can get the 
impression that he left no room for the kind of solitary and intimate relation to God 
that is found in Kierkegaard. Consider the following quotations:  
It is not enough to say it is a metaphysic of Being. It is a metaphysic of the we are, 
not the I think.37 
I concern myself with Being only in so far as I have a more or less distinct 
consciousness of the underlying unity which ties me to other being of whose 
reality I already have a preliminary notion.38 
From the moment we open ourselves to these infiltrations of the invisible, we 
cease to be the unskilled and yet pretentious soloist we perhaps were at the start, 
and gradually become (conscious) members, wide-eyed and brotherly, of an 
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37 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, 2 vols. (Chicago, IL: Gateway Edition, 1970), 10. 
38 Ibid., 19. 
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orchestra in which those whom we so inaptly call the dead are quite certainly 
much closer to Him of whom we would not perhaps say that He conducts the 
symphony, but that He is the symphony in its profound and intelligible unity.39 
 
In the first passage, we are reminded of Marcel’s adamant rejection of a Cartesian 
metaphysic and his isolated cogito in favor of what he called “a metaphysic of the we 
are.” The following quote more specifically seems to state that we cannot know Being 
unless we are first aware, at least to some degree, of our connection or unity with 
others; this is significant since he equated God with Being, hence the statement seems 
to apply to knowing God as well. Moreover, this second quote refers to what Marcel 
termed our inter-subjective nexus or union; this union or our awareness of it is the 
precondition for our consciousness of Being or God. In the third passage, this seems to 
be stated more explicitly, so much so that it appears as if we are part of a symphony 
and that which unifies, the inter-subjective nexus, is equated with God.  
 Thus, from the above, it can surely appear as if our means to approaching God 
seems to be through our inter-subjective relations with others and perhaps to the 
exclusion of some solitary or private relation to God. However, if these passages, in 
conjunction with others, are read carefully, we can see that none of what Marcel 
suggested is to the exclusion of God and His necessary role in our lives and in our 
being. There are many ways that the above can be resolved and the first thing we can 
start with is by pointing out that Marcel does not, in fact, simply equate the inter-
subjective nexus with God. He stated, 
Can we admit that we have reached a point where we may identify Being with 
inter-subjectivity? Can we say Being is intersubjectivity? I must answer 
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immediately that it seems to me impossible to agree to this proposition if it is 
taken literally. The true answer, it seems to me, is something much more 
subtle….40 
 
If he does not identify the inter-subjective nexus with God, as we see him deny in this 
passage, then Marcel is not in danger of being a kind of pantheist who leaves no room 
for a transcendent God we can relate to personally. In fact, he did leave room for such 
an awareness of God that did not directly include others. In the following passage, we 
see Marcel express himself in a way that one could, perhaps, have confused him with 
Kierkegaard. He stated, 
Perhaps my soul would be the ego of the psychologist, which really only a him, 
were I not to converse about it with God, were it not involved and vitally 
interested in this conversation…If I am asked why my soul can only become itself 
when in relation to God, and when confronted with God, I cannot at present see 
any means of formulating an abstract answer which will satisfy me. But I can at 
least say this (though it needs elucidating and sifting): My soul is always a thou for 
God.41 
 
Not only is Marcel’s expression akin to that of Kierkegaard in that he spoke as if he 
could and did talk to God directly, but he emphasized a central Kierkegaardian theme, 
that we can only truly become ourselves before God. Thus, while we see in the 
previous passage that Marcel did not merely equate our unity with others with God, 
we also see that we can relate to God directly and further, that such a relation is 
fundamental to becoming ourselves. If this is the case, this alone brings him quite 
close to Kierkegaard, for he would only be incompatible with Kierkegaard if he were 
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Gabriel Marcel, Homo Viator, trans. Emma Craufurd (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), 67. 
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to deny that we can relate to Him directly and only through others, but from what has 
just been shown, this is patently false.  
Even further, although Marcel emphasized the community in our approach to 
God, he explained that in genuine community, or in our fidelity to others, one needs 
God as the foundation. In other words, he suggested that the condition for the 
possibility of unconditional fidelity is an awareness of an absolute Thou, as he called 
it, whether implicit or explicit. Consider the following quote:  
A particular individual may simply not think about what is ultimately involved in 
his or her unlimited faithfulness to a spouse or child or close friend or cause. In 
fact, such an individual could even verbally profess atheism, Marcel says. 
Nevertheless, only an assurance grounded in an encounter, however faint, with an 
absolute Thou can furnish the underpinnings of a person’s unconditional 
commitment to another creature.42 
 
In Marcel’s own words, “Unconditionality is a true sign of God’s presence.”43 As a 
result, it is undeniable that God, here, is necessary for our unconditional relations to 
others. Hence, we see that even for Marcel, God is the necessary third in our relations 
to others, so that God is never left out in all of our relationships. This is a similar 
concept to the one found in Kierkegaard where he expressed that God is the third in 
any love relationship. In fact, it could be argued that this is the cause of Kierkegaard’s 
emphasis on God, that is, that He is the ontological precondition of our love relation to 
others and this is essentially Marcel’s claim as well. Thus, the priority expressed in 
Kierkegaard of our relation to God could be seen either to perform a function of 
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43 Ibid. 
 48 
communicating something in the context of his text or to emphasize God’s ontological 
priority in relationships.   
Hence, as can be seen, then, Anderson position appears untenable. However, 
here we can again point to the source of the misunderstanding suggested above and 
address it in more detail. In other words, the objection to Kierkegaard’s philosophy 
being in harmony with that Marcel’s can be addressed by the fact that Marcel could be 
conceived as working within religiousness A, and thus, Anderson’s misunderstanding 
could be seen as having arisen from his not taking seriously enough the different 
forms of religiousness within the Kierkegaardian corpus. It is well known that 
Kierkegaard distinguished between what he calls religiousness A and religiousness B 
and even though Anderson seemed to be aware of this distinction, he did not think it 
relevant to his goal of distinguishing between Kierkegaard and Marcel, but I think it 
is. In religiousness A, for Kierkegaard, a person can relate directly and immediately to 
God. She can experience resignation, soul suffering, and guilt-consciousness, but God 
is still conceived as immanent in her;44 the personality can still relate to God and 
restore some kind of normalcy to its religious and ethical life through its own inner 
effort. In other words, as one commentator put it, this human religiosity “rests upon 
the supposition that truth is immanent in the human subjectivity.”45  Religiousness B, 
on the other hand, the specifically Christian religiousness, is the very opposite. Here, 
the truth lies outside the individual, and human subjectivity is untruth. The greatest 
human effort can only lead to an awareness of our absolute separation from God. This 
religiousness is characterized by sin-consciousness (which the individual cannot 
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achieve by himself, as guilt consciousness can in Religiousness A), and in the end, the 
individual person cannot be restored except by the revelation of God in history, in 
time. Now, it is significant that Marcel makes a similar distinction as mentioned above 
and we shall see why. He explained many times that he was not philosophically 
advocating Christianity, though it might lend itself to such a possibility; what is 
particularly relevant is that Marcel clearly expressed that in order to adhere to a 
particular religion, one must be called or have a conversion experience, so to speak. In 
order to have such a conversion, one can only make himself available or open to it; in 
other words, one needs grace. This is the same as in Kierkegaard. Thus, although in 
Kierkegaard God provides the condition for the possibility of faith in God or true 
Christian religiousness, we can see that Marcel holds the same view. Hence, it is in 
this sense that one must be alone before God, for no one can truly convert another 
person except God and this is so for both Kierkegaard and Marcel. However, what is 
most significant here is that if one does not make this distinction that they both seem 
to make, then we are liable to misunderstand their entire philosophical projects, at 
least in relation to one another, as Anderson may have done. 
In other words, what has been shown is that perhaps because of their different 
historical factors or existential situations, they may have been responding to different 
historical factors and thus, had different goals or audiences in mind. That is, because 
of what they were each attempting to address, one might have been called toward a 
more individualistic emphasis in their religiousness while the other was drawn to a 
more communitarian emphasis (or religiousness). Kierkegaard was expressly 
attempting to convert Christians into true Christians, while Marcel was addressing 
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himself to a more general philosophical public/community and initially did not have 
any specifically Christian incentive or affiliation. It was the nature of his philosophical 
investigations that led Marcel to Christianity, while Kierkegaard began his work as a 
Christian. This must surely, then, account for much of their differences.46. We need 
not think that they are incompatible, not only given the initial explanation of this 
section, but simply because, as we have seen, Marcel was not meaning to espouse a 
strictly Christian philosophy—since he, in fact, thought this impossible—while 
Kierkegaard was specifically concerned with Christianity from the beginning. Clearly, 
this must account for much of their seeming differences, as well as the common 
misunderstandings of the two.  
 
Faith vs. Rationality 
 That Marcel did not want to forsake reason and understanding when speaking 
of our encounter with God or Transcendence (or coming to know God), while 
Kierkegaard advocated believing against the understanding47 is a view that Anderson 
also espoused. This perspective, however, which makes it appear as if Marcel’s 
approach is completely compatible with reason and understanding while 
Kierkegaard’s is not, is simply false.  
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 The notion that Kierkegaard clearly rejected reason while Marcel did not in 
their approach to God is exaggerated, if not obviously false, though it is also common. 
Consider the following passage from Brendam Sweetman:  
Gabriel Marcel has a quite unique approach to the question of the existence of 
God. It is an existentialist approach . . . yet it is not based on a faith commitment to 
God, as one finds…in Kierkegaard, whose view emphasizes the affective and 
volitional nature of one’s relationship with God at the expense, some would argue, 
of any rational approach.”48 
 
 First and foremost, in answering this common misunderstanding, it is 
important to keep in mind their intended goals and then, more specifically, be clear as 
to how they intend to go about it; as we shall see, when this is clarified, they do not 
seem as far apart as usually imagined. The reason their intended goal is significant was 
mentioned earlier; it was suggested that because Kierkegaard had a specifically 
Christian audience in mind and a specifically Christian goal, this would cause some 
apparent differences between them. Hence, in this particular issue of reason vs. faith, 
Kierkegaard would obviously appear to differ from Marcel because he was, strictly 
speaking, interested in Christian faith. It is in this context that Kierkegaard especially 
seemed to recommend believing against the understanding, but again, this is not so 
strange since Marcel himself expressed the idea that specific religiousness is outside 
of the realm of philosophy and hence, that the specifically Christian revelations are 
outside philosophical reflection and strictly a personal and private endeavor, much like 
Kierkegaard. At this point, then, they were, in fact in accord, for they both agreed that 
such Christian faith is based upon pure grace and a direct revelation or encounter with 
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God, which no human can be so pretentious as to think they were capable of achieving 
in another.  
 Aside from this more general point, however, we can also see that if we 
understand Kierkegaard correctly and in more detail, we see that it is implied in his 
approach that reflection, and even reason, can help lead us to the religious, though he 
claimed that (unaided) reason seeks or leads to its own destruction (in relation to 
God/faith). It is clear, indeed, that he did not completely do away with reason; it has 
its place. At the very least, it is implicit in Kierkegaard that reflection is a necessary 
tool, or can be, in bringing one to God; this is especially the case when we remember 
that in using pseudonyms, Kierkegaard showed that he believed in the possibility of 
seducing people into the religious, into the truth, and such a seduction cannot take 
place outside of reflection; hence, it is implied that in coming to God, reflection and 
understanding can play a role, even if it is to be removed so that there can be a true 
existential movement. Indeed, reason can have its role, even if it is just to show reason 
its own limits and force the individual to come face to face with his concrete reality 
and in the end, his need for God. However, if Kierkegaard’s intent is seen in this light, 
he was in accord with Marcel, for he also sought to show the limits of reason. Thus if 
there is a difference here, it is a matter of emphasis, goal, and perhaps terminology, 
but it is not an essential difference. This common ground of showing the limits of 
reason can be more clearly seen when we take into account Kierkegaard’s view of 
indirect communication, which may be connected to the notion of secondary reflection 
in Marcel. 
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 In Practice in Christianity, Kierkegaard explained the need for his indirect 
method and its nature in the following way: 
Whereas the objective thinker can perfectly well communicate directly the result 
of his own reflection, “the subjective existing thinker” discovers an impediment to 
communication in the further reflection that the truth he arrives at “interests” his 
existence (is part and parcel of it) and as such cannot simply be handed over to 
another, but to be appropriated, to becomes one’s own, it must be acquired through 
the same process of reflection by which it was originally reached. Hence the 
communication must be indirect, artfully devised to prompt the other to think out 
the thing for himself, while the subjectivity of the communicator remains 
concealed.49  
 
 Anyone familiar with Marcel should be struck by the poignant similarity of 
what Kierkegaard expressed here to Marcel’s philosophical approach, especially to 
what he called secondary reflection. The lynchpin of my argument here is that they 
seem to be trying to bring us back into contact with a concrete reality that is not 
achieved through mere abstract thought or unaided reflection, which is in large part 
the core of Kierkegaard’s revolt against reason. If we properly understand his actual 
critique of reason, the above misunderstanding we are trying to clarify would not have 
taken place. Indeed, as one commentator put it, “It is the totalizing reason that equates 
itself with reality and all truth, as in Hegel, that he rejected”50 With respect to the 
notion, as expressed earlier, which views Kierkegaard as voluntaristic, let us look at 
the following revealing passage from one commentator: 
Existentialism is thus neither intellectualistic nor voluntaristic, neither rationalistic 
nor irrationalistic. It transcends the distinctions. The validity of thought is in 
nowise denied. What is denied is that thought can be reduced to a rational, 
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objectifying, theoretical activity . . . (Kierkegaard) he speaks most positively of 
thought, as long as it is rooted in existence.51 
 
 Indeed, it cannot be more clearly illustrated that the reason Kierkegaard (as 
well as Marcel at times) has been thought to be an irrationalist and a voluntarist is not 
because there is truth in these claims, but because he has tried to tread a fine line 
between objective truth and the purely subjective. Clearly, Kierkegaard did not disdain 
thought in general, but a particular kind of thinking that attempts to capture all of 
reality though abstract thought and logical thinking. However, thought that is 
intimately tied to existence as explained in the above passage he, in fact welcomed, 
and even encouraged. In this sense, he was, again, in harmony with Marcel, for he 
claimed that his method is that of beginning in the concrete, moving to the abstract, 
and back to the concrete. As he stated it, “My method of advance does invariably 
consist, as the reader will have noticed already, in working my way up from life to 
thought and then down from thought to life again, so that I may try to throw more light 
upon life.” Indeed, in the following passage from Schrag who explains Kierkegaard, 
they seemed to have in mind strikingly similar notions:  
It is precisely the task of the existential thinker to think his existence. He must 
penetrate his concrete particularity and existential involvement with thought which 
has universal validity. The existential thinker is a thinker and an existing 
individual at one and the same time. He lives his existence at the same time that he 
thinks it . . . Kierkegaard’s far reaching reservations about Hegel arise, not because 
Hegel was a thinker, but because he identified thought with the rational and the 
logical. We must distinguish cautions Kierkegaard, between “pure thought” and 
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“abstract thought.” Abstract thought is that which reflectively examines and 
describes existence by preserving a relationship with it.52 
 
 In this rich passage, we see that, much like Marcel, thought and understanding 
have there very significant role to play in the life of a human being and in fact, one 
gets the impression that thought is indispensable for Kierkegaard. It is only that we are 
supposed to be a specific kind of thinkers, who think about our existence, as opposed 
to disdaining all thought in general. As nicely explained here, it is only thought as 
identified with the rational and the logical that Marcel had problems with, but this 
being the case, it begins to be clear that Marcel actually did not disagree with 
Kierkegaard.  
 Thus, let us look at Marcel with respect to this issue in more detail. In one 
place Marcel expressed the following: 
Person—engagement—community—reality: there we have a sort of chain of 
notions which, to be exact, do not readily follow from each other by deduction 
(actually there is nothing more fallacious than a belief in the value of deduction) 
but of which the union can be grasped by an act of the mind.53 
 
 What can be immediately gleaned from this passage is 1) that Marcel seemed 
to be rejecting the kind of reason, as mentioned above, that Kierkegaard rejected, 
which proceeds through pure deduction, that is, logic and 2) that although they are not 
arrived through reason, the mind can perceive it to be real. This second point is 
significant, since it shows how he, as well as Kierkegaard, was attempting to speak of 
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53 Pax, An Existential Approach to God, 38. Marcel, Homo Viator, 22. 
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a reality or truth which cannot be spoken of objectively, since they are outside the 
reach of pure reason alone. At this point, they seemed in total harmony, as is 
beginning to be clear. Consider another passage from Marcel: 
We are here at the most difficult point of our whole discussion. Rather than to 
speak of intuition in this context, we should say that we are dealing with an 
assurance which underlies the entire development of thought, even of discursive 
thought; it can therefore be approached only by a second reflection—a reflection 
whereby I ask myself how and from what starting point I was able to proceed in 
my initial reflection, which itself postulated the ontological, but without knowing 
it. This second reflection is recollection in the measure in which recollection can 
be self-conscious.54 
 
 From these statements, we see that Marcel was also launching a critique of 
reason of his own or of a particular kind of reason; this critique is clearly analogous to 
that of Kierkegaard’s. It might even be the case that Kierkegaard would not object to 
Marcel’s kind of reflection and understanding if he had been exposed to it. It is a 
particular kind of arrogant reflection, objective/scientific, and totalizing reason, which 
both of them rejected. Furthermore, though it might be said that Marcel made more 
use of reflection in coming to religious consciousness, while Kierkegaard wanted to 
reject such an approach, it is also the case that while allowing an awareness of 
transcendence through reflection, Marcel was also adamant that such contact with God 
(transcendence) is one that is beyond all conceptual grasp and description, hence 
beyond our understanding. Indeed, his notion of Being and God55 was that which 
resists and overflows all conceptions that we attempt to ascribe to it. Hence, they 
evidently seemed to approach each other from opposite ends and came into contact 
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and to be clear, they came into contact in wanting to bring their audience into contact 
with their existential reality, and not through a thought that disconnects itself from 
lived experience.  
 
Immanence and Transcendence 
 As is well known, Kierkegaard’s God appears to be much more transcendent 
than that of Marcel’s. There appears to be an absolute gulf between God and man in 
Kierkegaard, such that this separation—through man’s sin—is capable of being 
repaired only by God and not by man. In Marcel, on the other hand, we easily get the 
impression that God, for him, was quite immanent and that the separation between 
man and God was not so great; in fact, the closeness was so great that the separation 
was not as obvious, so that one could perhaps reasonably argue that there was a sort of 
continuity between God and man for Marcel. If such is the case, it would be a small 
step to consider man as being capable of reaching God through his own powers, so to 
speak, or his nature—that is, that one could approach God through one’s own efforts. 
To explore this possibility, let us recall an earlier passage, already quoted, where 
Marcel stated, 
From the moment we open ourselves to these infiltrations of the invisible, we 
cease to be the unskilled and yet pretentious soloist we perhaps were at the start, 
and gradually become (conscious) members, wide-eyed and brotherly, of an 
orchestra in which those whom we so inaptly call the dead are quite certainly 
much closer to Him of whom we would not perhaps say that He conducts the 
symphony, but that He is the symphony in its profound and intelligible unity.56 
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 Surely it appears here that Marcel took God to be quite close to man so that 
one could hardly distinguish between them and one might even go as far as to think 
that he is proposing a kind of pantheism. However, more to the point, if this was his 
view of God, that we intimately participate in God’s reality, then surely we cannot be 
far from being able to reach God through our own powers, or so it seems. Hence, he 
appeared to be veering away quite far from Kierkegaard on this point. However, let us 
explore further if it is, in fact, the case, that is, that they were at odds with each other 
at this juncture.  
 Recalling a point made earlier as to the fact that they had different purposes in 
mind when writing their text, it might be useful to note, once again, that Kierkegaard 
made a distinction between different kinds of religiousness and further, that Marcel 
did the same. It is significant to recall this since it could be argued that in light of the 
fact that Marcel denied that we can truly philosophize about a specific revealed 
religion, such as Christianity, then Kierkegaard and he were actually speaking past 
each other. In other words, they were, by and large, speaking of different things: 
Kierkegaard, of Christianity and of the Christian faith and Marcel, of the generally 
religious which can be experienced by anyone without belonging to any specific 
religion. This can even be taken a bit further. Their apparent difference could be 
explained as a product of the fact that, under Kierkegaardian terminology, Marcel was 
working within religiousness A, while Kierkegaard was interested in pure Christianity. 
Indeed, there are places where Anderson described Kierkegaard’s notion of 
religiousness A in terms that are almost identical to that of Marcel; for instance, he 
stated that “religion A maintains that in one essential dimension of his being man 
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participates in the eternal realm of God,”57 which is a language endemic to that of 
Marcel’s descriptions of God and His relation to man. He also explains religiousness 
A as the religiousness of immanence and quotes passages from Kierkegaard that 
suggest that God, at this stage, can be viewed as being inside a person. Again, what 
this shows is that we might, indeed, be misinterpreting them if we do not keep such 
distinctions in mind and that their views were closer than it might seem since, when it 
seems that they were disagreeing, it is plausible to think that it is because one was 
speaking to the realm of the specifically Christian, while the other was not. However, 
let us not lose focus on the present issue: whether Marcel’s view of God, as expressed 
in the above passage, is too immanent to be reconciled with Kierkegaard. 
 Now, aside from the possible misunderstanding mentioned above, Marcel 
actually denied that he was a pantheist, and more specifically, that the quote just above 
was not intended to equate the inter-subjective nexus between people and God; indeed, 
there is plenty of evidence that Marcel’s notion of God is not as immanent as it might 
first appear, which thus brings him closer to Kierkegaard than typically recognized. 
Consider the following quote: 
The more we take notice of the specific character which the affirmation of God 
presents—above all the fact that it aims at a transcendental reality—the more we 
have to realize that no fact of any kind, no objective structure, can be placed on a 
level with this reality and exclude it.58  
 
 It is clear from this that Marcel was expressing that God is utterly beyond any 
objective structure in the world, and in this way, completely transcends it. Another 
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58 Gabriel Marcel, “Contemporary Atheism and the Religious Mind.” Philosophy Today 4, no. 4 
(Winter 1960): 254.  
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place where it becomes evident that Marcel showed that his notion of God was close 
to that of Kierkegaard’s in its transcendent element is the following passage: 
Unlike both the atheist and the traditional theologian or philosopher who would 
demonstrate the existence of God, the man of faith looks not to an ultimate and 
necessary metaphysical that, but to an absolute Thou who can only be approached 
by invocation and testimony. In this sense Kierkegaard rightly saw our approach to 
God as a leap into the abyss of faith.59 
 
 Here we see Marcel quite explicitly agreeing with Kierkegaard that God cannot 
be approached through logical demonstrations or arguments, in short, by our natural 
powers of reason, but by relating to Him as a subject or an absolute Thou; yet, more 
importantly, he was also suggesting that God is, in fact, transcendent from the world 
such that we can approach him only through “invocation and testimony,” as he put it. 
As a result, he was admitting that we are left only with the leap into “the abyss of 
faith” that Kierkegaard spoke of. It appears, then, that he was in agreement with 
Kierkegaard in both the fact that God is transcendent, and that this transcendence 
makes him inaccessible to us through our natural powers. In fact, it was also admitted 
by Anderson that they both suggested that we must ultimately rely on grace to come 
truly to God. This is especially the case for Marcel when we are speaking of the 
specifically Christian; in this realm, he spoke only of the conversion experience as 
being appropriate. That is, only through a personal conversion experience does a man 
truly become a Christian and such a conversion is clearly thought to be outside the 
power of the natural man. Thus again, when we remain clear as to when we are 
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speaking of the specifically Christian or not, it becomes clearer that Kierkegaard and 
Marcel’s supposed opposition is only apparent.  
 Now, we have only to see if Kierkegaard’s alleged radical transcendence can 
be brought down to a level compatible with that of Marcel’s notions, since we have 
already seen that Marcel’s notion of God can be brought closer to that of 
Kierkegaard’s. The first thing to point out in accomplishing such a task is to be as 
specific as possible in what Kierkegaard’s view of transcendence actually was. Well 
here, again, if we remember that Kierkegaard was, by and large, concerned with 
Christianity, we can more accurately understand his notion of transcendence, and how, 
at this level, he was fundamentally in agreement with Marcel; in other words, when 
Kierkegaard was speaking ontologically about the nature of God or reality, as he often 
seemed to be doing in WOL, we see that God seems to be quite immanent and is even 
described as being “within a person’s innermost being.”60 However, when he was 
strictly speaking about Christianity, and in this context, remarked about our 
relationship to God, he spoke of God as being utterly transcendent and far from us; 
however, this is clearly because he was intent on emphasizing our utter qualitative 
difference from God. By this, he meant that as sinners, we are utterly separate and 
distant from God. As such, then, his claim was not to be taken as the declaration of 
God’s utter transcendence at an ontological level—since he spoke of God in terms 
quite similar to those of Marcel’s in many places—but as one that declares a 
qualitative distinction between man and God, which we can recognize only by the help 
of God Himself; of course, after such a divine revelation, we would have come closer 
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to knowing the truest or highest notion of God, as Kierkegaard would have it. Note, 
moreover, that the notions of God by a person in religiousness A as immanent were 
never denied by Kierkegaard, but in religiousness B, we simply see a greater notion of 
God that we can only come to by grace; where religiousness A believed that one could 
relate to God through her own powers; in religiousness B, the relation is wholly 
established by the power of God, not man. 
 Having said this, it has been shown that Kierkegaard’s notion of transcendence 
was often in the context of what he thought was true Christianity, but that inasmuch as 
we are speaking ontologically, Marcel’s notion of God as the ground of being and the 
absolute Thou are not far from what Kierkegaard suggested. Let us, then, look briefly 
at some Kierkegaardian passages that illustrate this point further. In explaining the 
origin or source of Love, Kierkegaard expressed, 
There is a place in a person’s innermost being; from this place flows the life of 
love, for from the heart flows live. But you cannot see this place; however deeply 
you penetrate, the origin eludes you in remoteness and hiddenness. . . . From this 
place flows love along many paths, but along none of these paths can you force 
your way into its hidden origin. Just as God dwells in a light from which flows 
every ray that illuminates the world, yet no one can force his way along these 
paths in order to see God, since the paths of light turn into darkness when one 
turns toward the light—so Love dwells in hiding or is hidden in the innermost 
being.61  
 
 Aside from the image of God as the light of the sun upon which one cannot 
gaze directly, what is most striking about this passage is that the origin of love is 
claimed to dwell within man himself. If we recall the fact that Kierkegaard has already 
equated God with Love itself, then the above amounts to stating that God resides deep 
within humans themselves, and not outside. Clearly this is not the typical Kierkegaard 
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that many have come to know, that is, one who views God as utterly transcendent 
from the world. Of course, he claimed that we cannot glance upon God directly, but 
neither can we do so according to Marcel; this is precisely the reason he found it 
necessary to employ his notion of secondary reflection—an indirect methodology—
and why he spoke of a blinded intuition, for we cannot gaze upon God directly. 
 Another such passage that brings Kierkegaard’s notion of God much closer to 
that of Marcel is the following:  
Love’s hidden life is in the innermost being, unfathomable, and then in turn is in 
an unfathomable connectedness with all existence. Just as the quiet lake originates 
deep down in hidden springs no eye has seen so also does a person’s love originate 
even more deeply in God’s love.62  
 
 Here, not only are we told that human love originates in God’s love—God 
being the precondition for our human love—but it is claimed that God, as Love, is 
unequivocally within the innermost being of all people. He stated even more strongly 
that this Love, which is God, was in an “unfathomable” connection with all of 
existence. A clearer ontological claim could not be made; it is obvious that 
Kierkegaard saw God as the ontological foundation, not only of our love, but also of 
all existence. Hence, much like in Marcel, God, here, is characterized as the ground of 
Being. It is for this reason that Kierkegaard could confidently assert, “Ah, but if you 
bear in mind that from the point of view of Christianity and truth God is always 
present in everything, that it is solely around him that everything revolves.”63  
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 In the end, then, we have seen that though Kierkegaard’s God appears to be 
overly transcendent and incompatible with that of Marcel’s God, it turns out that 
Kierkegaard’s God is not as divorced from the world as it first appears and neither is 
Marcel’s God as immanent as one may think in Marcel. Assuredly, they are not as 
distinct on this point as usually depicted and in fact, appear to come into contact on 
some passages, especially when their remarks are understood in their proper context 





 Finally, the foregoing has intended to show that although Kierkegaard and 
Marcel could easily be viewed as holding mutually exclusive philosophies, careful 
consideration of their text reveals that such an easy distinction is not as easily justified. 
The method of approach has shown that on every major issue typically ascribed to 
Kierkegaard as being opposed to Marcel, there are passages that seem to leave the 
possibility of including the others’ viewpoint, thus, making them mutually inclusive. It 
can be admitted, of course, as professor Anderson pointed out, that they seemed to 
emphasize experiential approaches that were distinct, but a mere emphasis did not 
equal the exclusion of other possibilities or even of opposed possibilities. In other 
words, although it is true, in fact, that Kierkegaard could be seen to be emphasizing 
“negative” human experiences such a guilt, sin, anxiety, despair, and so on in our 
approach to God while Marcel seemed to focus on positive experiences such as love, 
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fidelity, and hope, it is not the case that Kierkegaard said nothing of such experiences, 
or did not allow for them to be of aid in bringing us to God, and vice versa. What is 
more, we have seen that on three major points of possible tension—their views of the 
individual vs. community, faith vs. rationality, immanence vs. transcendence covered 
in the sections above—the supposed extreme usually viewed as not being held by the 
other was contradicted many times by passages that resembled the other’s view, or at 
least, made their distinction less clear. Whatever remaining issues may not have been 
directly addressed, I suspect that the answer lies in what I have suggested with respect 
to their focus; my general response to the apparent un-resolvable differences between 
these thinkers has been that they essentially spring from a subtle misreading of their 
texts. In other words, though Professor Anderson’s account is correct in many ways, 
upon a deeper analysis, the differences between them begin to reveal themselves as 
less definitive and inconclusive. I believe it has been shown sufficiently that their 
supposed differences usually arose out of their respective interest, focus, and 
individual goals, such as bringing people into a true Christianity for Kierkegaard, and 
reflecting philosophically about the nature of faith and how we are to have a proper 
knowledge of Being or of God for Marcel. It is also because of these diverse interests 
and purposes that there arise differences in terminology, which is what causes much of 
the confusion. In light of this, after clarifying some terminological difficulties and the 
individual emphases of each, we are able to pierce more deeply into their relation and 
begin to see not only their compatibilities with one another, but also the fact that they 
were, in fact, often complimentary, though Anderson remained skeptical of it. Yet 
indeed, though some differences must be admitted, the differences, I have argued, lie 
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in emphases, rather than on substantial irreconcilable differences.64 In reality, my 
claim is that their mutual exclusivity is not to be taken for granted or as being so 
obvious, and that further reflection is at least warranted to support such a claim, for 
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Introduction    
The following attempts to explore the possibility of an existential proof of God 
by developing a viable option for the notion of an existential truth. To be clear, I do 
not yet intend to provide an existential proof, but simply to strive toward laying the 
groundwork for its possibility. It will generally be argued that such a foundation has 
already been laid within the philosophies of Soren Kierkegaard and Gabriel Marcel, as 
already mentioned. It will first be shown that Kierkegaard’s notion of truth is not a 
subjectivist or relativistic one, (as it is commonly thought), thus revealing his 
contribution to the problem of religious truth. Then, it will be argued that although 
Kierkegaard’s philosophy may retain some level of obscurity, Marcel’s brand of 
existentialism allows for a clearer elaboration of what Kierkegaard opens the door for, 
but leaves mostly implicit. Finally, it is hoped, that a plausible notion of existential 
truth will become clearer via the analysis here provided of Kierkegaard and Marcel, 
which in turn, will open up a space for what I choose to call an existential proof of 
God.65 
 
Kierkegaard’s Existential Approach 
Before proceeding to Kierkegaard’s notion of existential truth, I would like, as 
a point of departure, to briefly discuss some of the possible problems that might arise 
with the notion of an existential proof of God. To begin, if one is to speak of an 
existential approach to God, it is clear that by its very nature, the approach must be 
one that attempts to bypass the traditional analytic methodology in dealing with the 
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approach in the literature is extremely scarce.  
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question. But as such, one faces some peculiar difficulties: the most pressing of these 
is that, as an existential approach, the “argument” does not allow for a conceptual 
point of departure from which a logical conclusion can be progressively and 
systematically derived (for that would entail an analytic methodology). As a result, an 
existential approach to God is one that must remain in large part unsystematic, and for 
that reason, introduces an unexpected difficulty for the reader; though, an author 
sometimes desires such difficulties for his own purposes, such as in Kierkegaard. An 
existential approach, then, is one that may not even possess a clearly presented 
argument, or rather, one that is easily discerned, and this is usually based upon the 
insight that what is being revealed has an element that cannot be contained within the 
limits of a conceptual framework. It is for this reason that many existentialists, such as 
Kierkegaard and Marcel, have resorted to a more literary or artistic form of expression 
and philosophizing. Kierkegaard wrote many books through pseudonyms and Marcel 
wrote plays, dramas, and metaphysical diaries. Moreover, even Marcel’s strictly 
philosophical works were not systematic in any usual sense of the word. So how can 
we categorize such an approach? The view here suggested is that what Marcel and 
Kierkegaard attempted to show us, they do so through a kind of phenomenological 
approach, broadly speaking, that is focused upon existence, or the existing concrete 
individual. It is for this reason that I would characterize their approach as a 
phenomenological-existential approach, or for the sake of simplicity, an existential 
approach.66 
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kind of phenomenological approach, broadly construed, that is focused upon existence.   
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A further problem that can arise is that of characterizing a proof of God as 
existential since it could be said that the notion of a proof is contrary to the notion of a 
proof. However, in the context of what has already been said, some light can be shed 
on the issue. Indeed, it is true that the very juxtaposition of the terms existential and 
proof may sound like an oxymoron to anyone remotely familiar with the notion of 
existentialism and proof, but this need not be the case.67 The first point of clarification 
to be made is that the term existential is precisely meant to qualify the latter term; that 
is, it is meant to indicate a shift in the use of the word proof. In other words, the term 
existential is intended to give a new color, or quality, to the word proof.68 Hence, the 
point is that the term is surely being used in a qualified sense; and this qualified sense 
is one that entails a revelation of truth in the manner mentioned above, intended to be 
explored below, and that most existentialist thinkers have generally used.69 
As mentioned above, many existentialists have indeed sought other means of 
philosophizing that have not been the traditional academic, or analytical, approach. A 
prime example of this is Kierkegaard. As already noted, many existentialists’ impetus 
toward such an approach is the insight that some truths may wholly, or in part, escape 
the purview of conceptual-analytical thinking, that is, conceptual-objective thought. 
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69 It is important to note at this point that I am not implying in this paper that Kierkegaard or Marcel 
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modification in our use of terms, that such a proof can be made possible through their work. 
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This is clearly evident in the work of Kierkegaard as can be seen in the following 
passage: 
Whereas the objective thinker can perfectly well communicate directly the result 
of his own reflection, “the subjective existing thinker” discovers an impediment to 
communication in the further reflection that the truth he arrives at “interests” his 
own existence (is part and parcel of it) and as such cannot simply be handed over 
to another, but to be appropriated, to becomes one’s own, it must be acquired 
through the same process of reflection by which it was originally reached. Hence 
the communication must be indirect, artfully devised to prompt the other to think 
out the thing for himself, while the subjectivity of the communicator remains 
concealed.70  
 
Aside from the obvious richness of the passage, one of the most impressive 
aspects that may be noticed is the fact that Kierkegaard was clearly affirming that 
there was a truth that “the subjective existing thinker” is trying to communicate, and 
further, that he could not do so through objective thought, or an objective approach, 
that is, directly. So two significant things we see here are 1) the affirmation of a truth 
and 2) its incommunicability. The affirmation of truth is significant here because 
Kierkegaard has for many years been thought to fall into the problem of subjectivism 
or relativism, whether intentionally or not. However, it is absolutely clear in this 
passage that he is at least intending to speak of a truth that is objectively real, else he 
would not try to communicate it, and further, that it is a particular kind of truth that 
has the peculiar quality of not being able to be communicated in the usual way. The 
question remaining, then, is why? The answer lies in his statement that the truth he 
speaks of “interests” his existence and is “part and parcel of it;” in other words, it 
cannot be separated from his intimate subjective acquaintance with it. It is for this 
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reason that, for Kierkegaard, the form could not be separated from the content, from 
that which is being explored. Again, this is because the form, in some sense, is the 
content itself. This means, in reality, that the “truth” that is being sought—that is, God, 
in this case—cannot be found apart from the mode of seeking. The mode of seeking is 
supposed to be a subjective one, since that which is being communicated was found 
through subjective means, and as Kierkegaard put it, (for this very reason), had to be 
sought through the same process it was discovered, that is, subjectively. More 
specifically, the reason this truth must be sought and discovered subjectively is 
because its nature is such that it has an intimate relation to the individual and can thus 
be revealed only through his/her own existence. Further, because this truth to be 
communicated is intimately tied to the individual existence of the communicator, it 
can only be communicated indirectly, “artfully,” in such a way that it may prompt the 
“receiving” party to search her own existence and thereby come to realize this truth 
within her own life. Again, as Kierkegaard suggested, it is a truth that “interests” the 
individual’s existence itself, and can thus only be known by one who is not indifferent 
to his/her own existence, as it might be said that an objective thinker is bound to be—
by the very nature and necessities of his approach. 
 
Kierekegaard and Existential Truth 
In light of this, it is evident that Kierkegaard’s reason for writing through 
pseudonyms was to communicate a truth, which though objectively real71 in his view, 
was nevertheless incapable of being communicated directly. However, from the above, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 I think it appropriate to call the truth he is attempting to communicate “objectively real” since 
otherwise, I take it, he would not consider it a truth.  
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one can still remain quite skeptical toward Kierkegaard’s suggestion and desire a 
clearer exposition as to his notion of truth. In other words, it might still be argued that 
he has simply not said enough to absolve him from the problem of subjectivism or 
relativism, since the objectivity of the supposed “truth” to be communicated can still 
be put into question. Now, although a full defense of Kierkegaard’s notion of truth is 
not intended here,72 it would be useful to see if we can go any further in uncovering a 
basis for his claim or whether there is a kind of religious epistemology within his 
work.  
 In order to address this question, it will be useful to refer to his Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript where he deals with the issue of truth and objectivity at some 
length. It is in this work that he made one of his many controversial claims: “Truth is 
Subjectivity.” The first observation to be made, in order not to fall into the common 
misinterpretation that Kierkegaard was intending to speak of truth as being merely 
subjective, is that he was speaking here specifically of religious truth and not of truth 
as a whole—for he did respect a principle of objective truth, just not within the 
religious, as will become clearer. Thus, although this distinction helps to clarify 
things, we are not yet out of the woods. His initial definition of truth in this section—
which he also equated with faith—seems to be the perfect antithesis to objectivity (and 
this is as it should be) for he stated that religious truth was “an objective uncertainty 
held fast through appropriation with the most passionate inwardness.”73 However, he 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 There is a new and growing body of literature in defense of Kierkegaard on this issue, and the tide 
has indeed been changing in the traditional interpretations of his work. The most convincing defenses I 
have encountered can be found in the works of Stephen Evans and Merold Wesphal. 
73 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 203. 
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then also stated that this was “the highest truth there is for an existing person”74 (my 
emphasis), which in itself already began to suggest that he was condoning neither 
subjectivism nor relativism, per se. He was simply pointing out a certain aspect of our 
human condition: because we are finite, existing, human beings in the process of 
becoming, the highest truth (“knowledge”) we can reach with respect to the religious 
is not to be found in the objective realm, but within subjectivity itself or through 
subjective appropriation, as Kierkegaard sometimes expressed it. Through the 
pseudonym Johannes Climacus, Kierkegaard was suggesting then, that, objectively, 
religious questions emphasized what was believed, that is, the thought content, but that 
subjectively, the emphasis was on the how of the belief. 
Thus, this means that subjectively, the emphasis is on the relation itself and not 
on the object of belief: the question is whether the relation itself is one of truth. He 
claimed, then, that subjectively, the truth was precisely the how of belief: the inward, 
infinite passion itself, in our relation to God, was the truth. Perhaps the most helpful 
example of this would be Kierkegaard’s notorious passage of the idolater praying in 
truth to a false god. In the postscript, he provided us with the following illustration: 
If someone who lives in the midst of Christianity enters, with knowledge of the 
true idea of God, the house of God, the house of the true God, and prays, but prays 
in untruth, and if someone lives in an idolatrous land but prays with all the passion 
of infinity, although his eyes are resting upon the image of an idol—where, then, is 
there more truth? The one prays in truth to God although he is worshiping an idol; 
the other prays in untruth to the true God and is therefore in truth worshiping an 
idol.75 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Ibid. Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel, 121. 
75 Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 201. 
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Clearly, then, what Kierkegaard was suggesting here was that the religious truth he 
was speaking of was not merely to be known through the content of thought—such as 
the idea of the “true” God of the Christian—but through our very mode of being. That 
is, the passage indicates that we shall come to truly “know” the truth of Christianity 
only by a proper relation to its truth, through infinite passion, which would put us 
within the truth we seek. In other words, the essential element of Christianity, as 
viewed by Kierkegaard, is not thought content; he seemed to be indicating that the 
essential element was the very mode of being of the person, which puts him in contact, 
or rather, places him within the truth. Though he did not express that the idea of the 
true God was irrelevant in religiousness, he did suggest that if we are cognitively to 
know the truth of Christianity at all, it is only through a proper mode of being that we 
could place ourselves in a position of encountering it or becoming aware of it. Of 
course, the fact that the mode or way of being is the most essential can also be seen by 
the fact that from the above illustration, we can see that anyone of us could be as the 
idolater who is relating to the true God without full awareness; again, this is because 
the truth is one that we encounter existentially, through our mode of being, rather than 
through pure thought alone. It is a truth that we can potentially know only though our 
participating in it, so to speak, or being that truth ourselves. It is in view of this that 
Kierkegaard similarly claimed that Christianity is not a doctrine, which is thought 
content, thus implying, instead, that it is a way of being. It is for this reason that 
Kierkegaard could say without hesitation that it is the how itself, or belief, that is the 
content of Christianity, that is, the truth. 
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 In my reading of Kierkegaard, then, his response to the problem of religious 
truth is one which attempts to tread a fine line between what is purely objective and 
what is purely subjective. Carl Schrag brilliantly expressed a clear explanation of this 
balancing act of Kierkegaard’s. He summarized the nature of Kierkegaard’s 
existentialism and what he took to be the nature of existentialism, as a whole, and 
shows concisely how he avoided the pitfalls of relativism and irrationalism. As he 
cleared up some of the common confusions usually attached to Kierkegaard’s thought, 
his analysis will provide a good transition to the existentialism of Marcel—with which 
he shared much—and its benefits. In his book, Schrag expressed the following:  
Existentialism is thus neither intellectualistic nor voluntaristic, neither rationalistic 
nor irrationalistic. It transcends the distinctions. The validity of thought is in 
nowise denied.76 What is denied is that thought can be reduced to a rational, 
objectifying, theoretical activity . . . (Kierkegaard) he speaks most positively of 
thought, as long as it is rooted in existence.77 It is precisely the task of the 
existential thinker to think his existence. He must penetrate his concrete 
particularity and existential involvement with thought which has universal validity. 
The existential thinker is a thinker and an existing individual at one and the same 
time. He lives his existence at the same time that he thinks it . . . Kierkegaard’s far 
reaching reservations about Hegel arise, not because Hegel was a thinker, but 
because he identified thought with the rational and the logical. We must 
distinguish cautions Kierkegaard, between ‘pure thought’ and ‘abstract thought.’ 
Abstract thought is that which reflectively examines and describes existence by 
preserving a relationship with it.78 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 It seems clear here that thought, as used by Kierkegaard, is analogous to Marcel’s use of the word 
reflection, which is also not merely reduced to the rational, but can penetrate into reality in its 
existential concreteness.  Hence, I will use thought and reflection as analogous terms throughout. 
77 This is another intimate point of contact with Marcel, as shall be seen later, for this seems precisely 
his aim when he claims that his method is one that begins in the concrete, moves to the abstract, and 
then goes back to the concrete. 
78 Schrag, Existence, and Human Freedom, 5. 
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This provides us not only with a good summary of much of the existentialist’s 
thought, but also with a useful transition to the thought of Marcel since it embodies 
much of the principles through which Marcel philosophized and which he shared with 
Kierkegaard. Indeed, they were both attempting to develop a different kind of 
reflection or thought that did not divorce itself from the concrete life of the individual. 
However, returning to Kierkegaard for the moment, although Schrag nicely illustrated 
how Kierkegaard did acknowledge the validity of thought and by-passes the labels of 
irrational or rational, the following question might still remain: are these explanations 
enough to transcend the subjective interpretation and provide for a kind of religious 
knowledge or epistemology? Of course, some may find this general account satisfying, 
but it is my guess that many may find it falls short of a proper grounding for religious 
truth. Granted that a more thorough or detailed account can be given of his notion of 
subjective truth (as some have tried) or existential truth, in order to be better grounded 
his claim, my contention is that one has to undergo much searching and digging in 
order to elucidate any substantial support. The reason for this, I believe, is quite 
simple.  Kierkegaard himself claimed to be attempting to make “Christians out of 
Christendom,” according to his own admission. As a result, it is safe to say that his 
concern was not primarily to address himself to philosophers of his time or 
epistemologist of our time, and because of this, his goal was not to develop a rigorous 
religious epistemology that would satisfy either. It is for this reason, then, that Gabriel 




Marcel and Existential Truth 
 As is known, aside from his artistic and creative endeavors, Marcel was clearly 
a philosopher addressing himself to philosophers (not to suggest that Kierkegaard was 
not—only that his emphasis lay elsewhere). As a result, Marcel’s account of 
existential truth, as I will call it, will be immensely helpful in providing for us an 
understanding of the strikingly similar notion of existential truth for which 
Kierkegaard opened the door but left without proper grounding. We shall see that 
Marcel not only paved the way for a notion of existential truth, but also provided us 
with an existential epistemology that greatly clarified what was left obscure in 
Kierkegaard. 
 Thus, while Kierkegaard seemed to thrust us into a realm outside of objectivity 
without proper foundation or protection from the perils of subjectivism, Marcel sought 
both to describe this realm as well as to justify its existence philosophically. In order 
to facilitate our understanding of Marcel’s epistemology, let us look at some 
secondary literature that does a good job of capturing the essence of his work. With an 
admirable exploration of the richness of Marcel’s philosophy and its importance to 
traditional philosophy, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel by Brendan Sweetman provides 
the following summary of Marcel’s existential epistemology: 
The distinction between experience and conceptual knowledge is obviously at the 
heart of Marcel’s new approach to epistemology. We have noted that he develops 
his epistemological views so as to allow a significant role for non-conceptual 
knowledge in human experience, and also in such a way as to enable the 
philosopher to recognize the nature of this non-conceptual knowledge and its 
value. Marcel has argued that there is a type of knowledge which is non-
conceptual, but which is nevertheless real79 (my emphasis). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel, 121. 
 79 
 
It can be easily seen from this passage that while Kierkegaard shied away from 
allowing a consideration of a proof for God and from developing an in-depth 
existential epistemology, Marcel has at least gone some way toward developing an 
epistemology that allows for a knowledge that is outside of conceptuality, thus 
creating an opening for a notion of existential truth. Marcel was clear in not only the 
fact that one can have knowledge outside of conceptual thought, but that the 
philosopher can recognize this realm as well as describe it—limited though the 
description might be. It is surely the case, then, that Marcel appeared to tread this line 
between the purely objective and the purely subjective more safely than Kierkegaard. 
 To understand Marcel’s existential epistemology fully, however, one must first 
understand one of his central discoveries or concepts: the notion of Mystery. Marcel’s 
notion of the realm of Mystery is precisely the realm of non-conceptual knowledge in 
the passage above, where something can be outside the conceptual realm and still be 
real. His discovery of this realm resulted from his interest in the nature of the 
subject.80 In his search into the nature of the subject, he realized that conceptual 
thought seemed unable to account properly for the reality of the subject and his most 
important experiences such as love, hope, fidelity, and an incarnate being immersed in 
a world with unique experiences; such observations were essentially the opening into 
that aspect of reality he calls the realm of Mystery. Mystery, of course, is an 
appropriate term given the fact that if it is agreed that thought cannot fully grasp it, it 
can obviously be said that it remains a Mystery to thought by its very nature. Marcel 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 This, of course, also echoes Kierkegaard’s own critique of German Idealism, of Hegelian philosophy 
in particular, in its lack of consideration for the existing individual.   
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essentially defined Mystery as the “sphere where the distinction between subject and 
object, between what is in me and what is before me, loses its meaning and its initial 
validity.”81 Put differently, he stated, “A mystery is a problem which encroaches upon 
its own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple 
problem.”82 Mystery, therefore, involves all that cannot be put completely before us 
and is not susceptible to our full conceptual analysis. An example of this that Marcel 
gave is that of the union between the body and soul (mind?), of which he stated: 
The indivisible unity always inadequately expressed by such phrases as I have a 
body, I make use of my body, I feel my body, etc., can be neither analyzed nor 
reconstituted out of precedent elements. It is not data, I would say that it is the 
basis of data; in the sense of being my own presence to myself, a presence of 
which the act of self-consciousness is, in the last analysis, only an inadequate 
symbol83 (emphasis his). 
 
A mystery, then, as seen from this example, transcends the realm of problems because 
it cannot be analyzed and solved through thought alone because the inquiry involves 
an object with which I am intimately involved and thus cannot make any objective 
judgments upon it: this is precisely what occurs in the instance of the connection 
between the body and the soul. The unity of body and soul, as he suggested, was 
something that was present to us and which was thus presupposed, so to speak, in all 
our experience; it could not, therefore, be treated as simply another object within our 
field of experience that we could fully analyze because it was not fully present before 
us since it was a presence in and to us, as he put it, or partook of our own being. In 
short, it is clear that mysteries, in Marcel’s sense, were the things within our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81 Gabriel Marcel, Being and Having (Westminster, England: Dacre Press, 1949), 117. 
82 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism (New York: Citadel Press, 1961), 19. 
83 Gabriel Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism (New York: Citadel Press, 1961), 19. 
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experience that our concepts could not fully grasp or properly explain on their own.84 
It was for this reason that he introduced what he calls secondary reflection, which was, 
generally speaking, the kind of reflection that makes us aware of and capable of 
describing the realm of Mystery by putting us into contact with it. 
 The four concepts, in fact, that give us a complete sense of his epistemology 
are primary reflection and secondary reflection, problem and Mystery, respectively. 
Let us begin with primary reflection. In essence, primary reflection can be viewed as 
the opposite of secondary reflection, and includes the following: complex theoretical 
thinking, everyday reflection conceptual abstraction, generalizations, and all that 
depends upon what is universal and verifiable. It can basically be said to include the 
entire realm of objectivity or objective thought. The important fact to remain aware of 
is that such thinking, that is, all that is within primary reflection, involves abstracting 
from our situated involvement in the world—which is the fundamental nature of the 
subject, or existing individual: to be an embodied being in a situation—in order to 
arrive at the disinterested concepts that are shareable, universal, and verifiable. It is 
upon this that primary reflection depends.85 Accordingly, he essentially called primary 
reflection the mode of thinking that dealt with the realm of the problematic, that is, the 
realm of “problems.” Problems are that which confronts us in our situated involvement 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84 One of the main analyses of the concrete subjects that lead Marcel to discover his notion of mystery 
was his existential/phenomenological exploration of the relation between the mind and the body, which 
he analyzes in Being and Having. He found that the experience of the subject could not be accounted 
through conceptual thought, and further, that this experience of the being my body as opposed to having 
a body within the plethora of objects could not be properly described or accounted for through 
traditional methodology; thus, he felt bound to assert a realm beyond conceptual thought that 
nevertheless reveals itself as valid through our own concrete experiences.  
85 It should also be noted that the influence of Descartes upon objective knowledge is manifested here in 
that the distinction between the subject and object is retained—where the subject is viewed as an 
observer isolated and looking out into the external world. 
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and requires a solution that is available to all. Primary reflection, then, deals with 
problems, and can be thought of as problem-solving thinking. Again, a problem is 
simply defined as that which presents itself before us in need of a solution that anyone, 
in theory, could come up with, hence, the usefulness of the abstract thought of primary 
reflection. All of the propositions and questions, then, that could be devised within an 
empirical science would fall under the rubric of the problematic for a problem is that 
which can, at least in theory (potentially), be solved through some technical procedure. 
It is against this backdrop that Marcel made his monumental contribution to 
philosophy with the introduction of his notion of Mystery and secondary reflection.  
 Secondary reflection, in contrast to primary reflection, deals with the realm of 
Mystery and bypasses the subject/object distinction upon which primary reflection 
depends. In primary reflection, in order to arrive at the universal concepts that make 
the possible communicable solutions to problems accessible to all, there needs to be an 
abstraction from our intimate involvement in the world, that is, our concrete situation. 
In order to do this, however, (for this abstraction to take place), a separation between 
the subject and the object must take place; that is, the object must be seen as 
completely separate from the subject, and for this reason, fully exposed and open for 
complete analysis by the subject. In this way, abstract thought, or primary reflection, is 
able to dissect its object into its parts in order to analyze and understand it. Yet, unlike 
primary reflection, secondary reflection restores the unity of experience that is lost in 
primary reflection: it binds what primary reflection severed and this it does because 
secondary reflection does not abstract from the situated involvement of the individual. 
It is through secondary reflection that we become aware of and have access to the 
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realm of Being, within which the concrete subject can be known or more fully 
encountered. In essence, secondary reflection gives us access to all that is left behind 
in the abstraction of primary reflection, which includes all that is intimate to the 
experience of the individual. It is there that things such as love, fidelity, faith, hope, 
God, evil, and so on can truly be explored and analyzed in their full existential 
significance. Secondary reflection is essentially recuperative of our fundamental 
connection to our concrete experience in the world. However, because of this, we have 
also left the realm of the verifiable, but we are not for that reason, according to 
Marcel, prevented from having knowledge, though our concepts may fail us at this 
point to give us the kind of objectivity that can make our knowledge public.   
 At this point, it may still be somewhat unclear as to how secondary reflection 
does allow for non-objective knowledge, so let us clarify further. First, let us highlight 
the dual factor that is involved in this process of secondary reflection. As Brendam, 
again, nicely explained, “Secondary reflection is a general term that refers both to the 
act of critical reflection on primary reflection and the realization or assurance of the 
realm of Mystery beyond primary reflection.”86 This kind of reflection, then, has at 
least two moments: that of reflecting upon the nature of primary reflection itself and 
perceiving its limits, and for this reason, thrusting us away from the confines of 
conceptual thought and into contact with actual experience. A further consequence (of 
non-objective knowledge or how secondary reflection makes possible non-objective 
knowledge) also seems to be a kind of action that arises from the assurance and 
experience of such a realm of Mystery. If it is still unclear as to how this realm is 
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discovered, it will be helpful, first, to note that Marcel sometimes described his 
approach as phenomenological analyses based upon our concrete experiences in the 
world. To gain further clarity of his method and how we may become aware of 
Mystery, let us consider an example. An instance of something within the realm of 
Mystery that Marcel discussed is the notion of presence. He stated the following: 
It is an undeniable fact, though it is hard to describe in intelligible terms, that there 
are some people who reveal themselves as “present”—that is to say, at our 
disposal—when we are in pain or in need . . . while there are other people who do 
not give us this feeling, however great is their good will. It should be noted at once 
that the distinction between presence and absence is not at all the same as that 
between attention and distraction . . . there is a way of listening which is a way of 
giving, and another way of listening which is a way of refusing, or refusing 
oneself.87 
 
In this rich and telling passage, it is beautifully illustrated how one can, in fact, come 
to know something with great clarity and certainty within our concrete experience and 
yet not be able to conceptually describe it, let alone communicate it to another! 
However, this was not shocking for Marcel, since this was the very nature of Mystery 
for him. What we are beginning to see here is how Marcel approached those things 
which cannot be dealt with conceptually, but that one can be quite certain of knowing 
them. This example clearly shows what Marcel meant by the possibility of non-
conceptual knowledge. However, let us attempt to go further.  
Although the above example demonstrates what Marcel meant by non-
conceptual knowledge within the realm of Mystery, let us attempt to ground further 
his notion of knowledge by taking one final step. It is significant for our purposes, 
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then, to note that Marcel also called the realm of Mystery, or the meta-problematical, 
the realm of Being. This is important because it helps us to understand the confidence 
he had in his approach and his claim to a knowledge that was outside the traditional 
conceptions of knowledge. In other words, what grounded Marcel’s unique 
epistemology was that he considered that we are immersed within Being. This he 
showed, for instance, in “The Ontological Mystery” which claimed that this is 
evidenced by the act of the skeptic who questions existence—and such doubt, by the 
way, can only arise in a thought that has already divorced itself from experience—for, 
it can be noticed that the question can only arise within the stage of existence, so to 
speak. In Marcel’s own words: 
It might be said, by way of an approximation, that my inquiry into being 
presupposes an affirmation in regard to which I am, in a sense, passive, and of 
which I am the stage rather than the subject. . . . I am therefore led to assume or to 
recognize a form of participation which has the reality of a subject; this 
participation cannot be, by definition, an object of thought; it cannot serve as a 
solution—it appears beyond the realm of problems: it is meta-problematical.88  
 
One of the main points here is that the very question of the reality of existence can 
only arise within the stage of existence, or rather, Being. That is, for Marcel, within 
our inquiry into being was implicitly contained an affirmation to which we are 
“passive,” or rather, in which we are “the stage rather than the subject,” because it 
affirms itself in the act of questioning. In yet other words, Marcel was indicating that 
Being affirms itself within us, in our very questioning of Being. As he explained in the 
second half of the passage, we are, in light of this, forced to acknowledge/recognize 
that we participate in a reality that encompasses the subject completely, on every side, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88 Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 18. 
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and thus cannot be put into question. This is what led Marcel to conclude that Being is 
what must be conceived as indubitably real, since it is that which must be presupposed 
in every inquiry (into being). Indeed, it is that which cannot, or should not, be put into 
question, since to do so would lead to the greatest absurdities or contradictions; it 
would lead us to deny, for instance, the reality which makes possible the reality of the 
subject that is asking the question. It is clear, then, from this passage, that the question 
presupposes Being in its questioning; that is, the act of questioning cannot occur 
outside of Being. Thus, this shows that we are entirely immersed within Being. Yet if 
this is admitted, although this participation cannot be an object for objective thought—
since we are immersed in that which we would seek to explore, as Marcel pointed 
out—we are, nevertheless, in a unique position to access it, though clearly not through 
the traditional means of an objective methodology which requires the distinction 
between the subject and object.  
 Indeed, if the above is taken for granted, then, our approach must be radically 
different from that of traditional approaches to the question of Being as already 
suggested earlier. This is surely the reason Kierkegaard and Marcel’s approach 
diverged so distinctly from traditional philosophy, for they had similar intuitions about 
the flaws and shortcomings of tradition. If the above is correct, however, we can 
indeed have access to Being because we are in the unique position of participation 
within Being, but this also means that we are immersed within the “object” we seek to 
explore, which creates a problem for our usual approach. That is, our approach must 
be transformed from that of a logical-analytic approach that systematically deals with 
concepts and attempts to derive valid conclusions. This alternate approach is what 
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Marcel called secondary reflection, of which we have already spoken, and through 
which we are to have access to Being. Thus, what Marcel sometimes called the realm 
of Being, the realm of Mystery, or the meta-problematic, and the reason for the need 
of secondary reflection as an alternative means to access these is revealed in the 
following passage: 
To postulate the meta-problematical is to postulate the primacy of being over 
knowledge (not as being as asserted, but of being as asserting itself); it is to 
recognize that knowledge is, as it were, environed by being, that it is interior to it 
in a certain sense . . . From this standpoint, contrary to what epistemology vainly 
seeks, there exists well and truly a mystery of cognition; knowledge is contingent 
on a participation in being for which no epistemology can account because it 
continually presupposes it (emphasis mine).89 
 
What can be gleaned from this important passage is the reason and grounding for all 
that has been said. That is, the need of secondary reflection is clearly seen to be that, 
for Marcel, ordinary knowledge, that is, traditional epistemology, was premised upon 
a cognition that could not properly ground itself because its true foundation was a 
“participation in being for which no epistemology can account,” no matter how much 
it deludes itself into thinking that it can; indeed, it had to “continually presuppose it” 
since it was surrounded by it. With this suggestion, we are beginning in the 
recognition of our participation in Being, for it is what surrounds all cognition to begin 
with: this, as discussed above, is also discovered through secondary reflection. 
However, to do so is to assert Being over all cognitive knowledge, so to speak, that is 
based upon primary reflection. Indeed, his critique was that all prior epistemology was 
based upon this kind of primary reflection, which remained ignorant of and refused to 
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  Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 20. 
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acknowledge its fundamental participation in Being, thus retaining its separation from 
that which founded it. Marcel, however, bypassed this problem through secondary 
reflection and showed that there is an alternate way other than that of traditional 
epistemological approaches that ignored our root-ness in Being and its ontological 
priority.90 In doing so, he reconfigured our fundamental epistemological assumptions 
and opened us into new grounds for an alternative form of knowing that ontologically 
preceded all conceptual thought or the realm of objectivity.  
As a result, we have seen that the realm of Mystery is that within which we can 
encounter Being itself and become aware of realities that cannot be fully grasped 
through concepts. Hence, the priority of Being over conceptuality affirmed by Marcel, 
together with his formulation of secondary reflection, provides the foundation for the 
non-conceptual knowledge mentioned at the opening of this section and of which I 
would simply give the name existential truth. Existential truth then, in light of what 
has been said, would be all that which can be revealed within the realm of Being or 
Mystery, that which transcends our ordinary categories of thought. It is a truth, that 
although not lending itself to be conceptualized and universalized, can nevertheless be 
recognized to be real and this sense known; this reality is one that can only, strictly 
speaking, be encountered or revealed through our own concrete experience in the 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 This is, of course, a reversal of Cartesianism, and this shall be dealt with in a more detailed fashion in 
the essay that follows this one.   
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Conclusion 
 In the end, then, it has been shown quite clearly that while Kierkegaard 
appeared merely to thrust us into the waters of what Marcel called Mystery, Marcel 
went some way into describing its nature, as well as into justifying its reality 
philosophically through the concepts of problem and mystery and their 
complementary forms of reflection. As a result, then, although it is evident that both 
Kierkegaard and Marcel opened up space for a truth that lay outside objectivity or 
objective thought and which Marcel called mystery, Marcel has provided us with a 
way to philosophically safe-guard this realm and allow us a greater understanding of 
it. More poignantly, it has been shown that Marcel has made it possible to speak 
plausibly of existential truth, which this essay endeavored to show. This, in turn, also 
makes possible the notion of a religious truth and epistemology that transcends the 
kind of objective thought that ultimately bypasses the true significance and meaning of 
religiousness by its very nature. In light of this, what then, can be said of the question 
with which we began as to the possibility of an existential proof of God? Well, in so 
far as we have established the fact that there is such a coherent notion of existential 
truth that is not merely subjective, then it stands to reason that an existential proof is 
indeed possible, for as such, it would mainly entail elaborating the pathway through 
which such a truth can be discovered or revealed. However, this would be the subject 






























In exploring the nature of an existential proof of God, one could surely begin 
with the fundamental question as to why Kierkegaard and Marcel wrote in the styles 
that they did. With their talents and abilities, they could have easily made it more 
congenial for all philosophers to follow their philosophical views. It could reasonably 
be asked why, with such brilliant minds, they did not write clearer philosophical 
treatises, but chose instead more creative, yet unsystematic, ways of writing that leave 
them vulnerable to misinterpretations. Or, more poignantly, for our purposes, it might 
be asked why, although they reject the traditional proofs of God, they seemed to 
affirm vehemently the existence of God and even spend their lives attempting to bring 
others to such an affirmation. The preliminary answer to this that can be gleamed at 
this point is that these questions are not entirely separate: indeed, they are intimately 
connected. It is safe to assume that given what has already been shown,91 they saw 
their unsystematic approaches as a necessary means toward the truth they sought to 
communicate. Thus, one can presume that if they had an assurance of God that did not 
involve the traditional methodology of logical analytic proofs, then they must have 
conceived of another way of arriving at such truth, or knowledge of God, and this 
“other way” is precisely what I seek to uncover and explore in this essay92 and which I 
also choose to call an existential proof. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91 This is a reference to the previous reflection on the notion of existential truth on which this essay is 
intending to build. It will attempt to continue exploring the notion of truth established there in order to 
investigate now the possibility of an existential proof and what it entails. 
92 I have already shown that Kierkegaard and Marcel seemed to reveal that there is something that, in 
my view, can be called existential truth and that the nature of this truth is what causes their unusual 
writing style and unsystematic approaches. Their approaches, evidently, were contingent upon their 
philosophical insights. At this point, I will delve further into such a notion of truth and how it relates to 
(or what it would mean for) the development of an existential proof, as I am calling it. 
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As a point of departure to the question of an existential proof, I will first begin 
with Marcel’s critique of Descartes, which ultimately provides a useful context; then, I 
will explore Marcel’s notion of ontological exigence as an important exemplary of an 
existential proof. I shall then proceed by exploring the notion of despair in 
Kierkegaard, within which I argue that a parallel notion of an existential-
phenomenological proof can also be found. 
 
Marcel’s Critique of Descartes 
 In order to properly uncover what an existential proof would entail, it will be 
useful to begin with some of the reasons for Marcel’s rejection of traditional 
philosophy and the reason for his approach. It could be argued, in fact, that the 
hallmark of his philosophy is his rejection and subsequent reaction to Descartes, that 
is, his reversal of some of Descartes’ fundamental insights, or assumptions, which 
Marcel took as a point of departure. We must, however, be cautious of too narrow a 
depiction of Marcel, as if he merely reversed some of Descartes’ presumptions and 
used them as a logical point of departure for his philosophical system. On the contrary, 
Marcel never systematically used any philosopher—since he rejected all philosophical 
system building—from which he derived or developed his own philosophy; he seemed 
to have developed his philosophy through many influences, but also, and perhaps most 
significantly, through reflection upon his own concrete experiences in life. It should be 
clear, also, that he critiqued not only Descartes and all philosophy influenced by him, 
but also German Idealism and any system-building philosophy thereof.  
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 For the purposes of clarity, therefore, I will focus upon his critique of 
Descartes, since it is of fundamental importance in an understanding of Marcel and 
since Descartes has perhaps been the greatest influence upon modern philosophy and 
all analytic philosophy. Marcel’s dissatisfaction with Cartesianism can be summarized 
as follows: Descartes’ portrayal of the subject is inadequate and his improper 
examination of the subject led to further problems such as the inability to properly 
account for the concrete individual’s own unique life experiences in the world.93 Such 
a critique of Descartes’ notion of the subject is crucial, for it is the foundation for his 
notion of truth, which Marcel put into question.94  
 What, then, is the crux of Marcel’s critique that would entirely reverse his 
approach to philosophy and characterizes his existentialism? One commentator, 
Brendam Sweetman, expressed the following about Marcel:  
He is not attempting to coerce the reader by force of logic alone into acceptance of 
his position, the latter approach being typical of Cartesian and recent analytic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 A similar critique can be found in Kierkegaard against Hegel. He faulted Hegel for leaving the 
individual out of his system, as if the individual had no essential part of the system, except, perhaps, as 
being the means through which the system is made manifest. 
94 There is an important note to be made here with respect to my use of both Marcel and Kierkegaard. It 
is entirely clear that neither of them would have approved, it is likely, of such a terminology as I have 
employed here with respect to knowledge of God and an existential proof (especially for Kierkegaard). 
However, this is of little consequence for me for several reasons—though time does not allow for an in-
depth discussion. One observation may suffice, namely that an existential approach such as his had not 
yet been developed and for this reason, he feared to veer into the realm of the “spirit of abstraction” in 
any way: this was the cause for his caution with respect to certain terminology. He would then be 
apprehensive about my use of terms on at least two counts: for appearing to confuse the “spirit of 
abstraction” with his own project, so to speak, and that it confused him with the existentialism he 
attempted to dissociate from so strongly. Yet, my contention is that both of these worries may be less 
serious in our times than they were in his. For one, existentialism, at least in some sense, has come to be 
better understood. At minimum we are better aware of its meaning and of its different possible modes, 
so that we know not to confuse Marcel with Sartre, for instance. Second, it is clear that such an attempt 
at a kind of proof is being attempted here within the principles he himself uncovered for us; thus, 
nothing, I believe, should stop us from developing or of conceiving a new notion of proof that lies 
within his notion of the realm of mystery and existential truth. Hence, fully aware of the reason for his 
apprehensions, my articulation of the “proof” attempts to tread a fine line that is both novel and 
consistent with his views, as well as that of Kierkegaard.  
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philosophy. Marcel believes that coercion by means of formal argument is not 
possible for most of the crucial issues that are the special concern of philosophy.95 
 
The reason for this attitude toward logical coercion or an analytic approach, as already 
noted, stems from a rejection of the Cartesian subject. However, let us explore further 
what Descartes’ approach entails, which would result in such a radical rejection of a 
logical/analytic methodology.  
In his search for certainty Descartes first postulated that the beginning of 
knowledge must be the thinking subject, since it was the only thing upon which he 
could not cast doubt; further, since he had not, and could not yet, establish the reality 
of the external/material world, this thinking subject was also conceived of as 
disembodied and looking out upon the world, thus giving rise to the mind-body 
problem. As a result, the subject was conceived of as an immaterial soul confronted 
with an external world, which it examined via its own “clear and distinct ideas.” Truth, 
then, was that of a correspondence between the ideas held in the mind and the world 
outside us.96 Such ideas, moreover, which properly corresponded to the world, he 
called clear and distinct ideas: we would, therefore, know the truth of something when 
we arrive at a clear and distinct idea of it. This notion in Descartes of course remained 
vague, but from this, one can understand the process by which we would arrive at 
what we would call a proof, i.e. logical coercion. Within this framework, a proof 
would inevitably entail a process of beginning with a proposition that expresses a clear 
and distinct idea, such as the cogito and from this premise, deriving certain other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Sweetman, The Vision of Gabriel Marcel, 9. 
96 This, in fact, can essentially be thought of as the traditional notion of truth as correspondence. Indeed, 
we have not veered far from this form of correspondence theory in modern epistemology.  
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premises which would eventually lead us to a conclusion we were attempting to 
establish97 or prove. It is clear, under this view, that our ideas or concepts, conceived 
as disembodied—that is, not dependent or derived from the external world—are not 
only our conduit to truth but, more fundamentally, are held to be ontologically prior 
and, thus, the foundation for the objectivity of knowledge or of our coming to know 
reality. This means that the objectivity of knowledge is ultimately couched upon our 
ideas. However, it is important to note that since such a view of objective knowledge 
is dependent upon a disembodied subject looking out upon the world of objects (or 
objects of the world), a rejection of such a subject would then entail a radical recasting 
of our notion of truth and objective knowledge altogether;98 indeed, the very notion of 
our traditional correspondence theory would be put into question and this is precisely 
what Marcel boldly did. He rejected the Cartesian model of the subject and thus 
opened up the door for a new conception of truth and foundation of knowledge: some 
of the consequences of which we shall explore as we proceed.  
However, Marcel’s rejection is not a simple denunciation and recasting of a 
similar epistemological model, but an exact reversal of the Cartesian subject. His 
approach, therefore, had to be fundamentally distinct if he reversed the Cartesian 
model. The logical approach to truth only holds under such a Cartesian schema, and 
thus, a rejection and reversal of the foundation of his epistemology is bound to have 
radical effects upon our philosophical approach and our view of knowledge altogether. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97 One problem, of course, with this kind of correspondence theory is that of knowing or being certain 
that our ideas properly correspond to the external world if we are completely apart from it. His solution 
depended on God existing and not deceiving us so that our clear and distinct ideas must be true; 
however, the problem that remains is that it seems to lead us into a circular argument since Descartes 
appeared to presuppose what he was trying to prove when he argued for God and his non-deception. 
98 At the very least, it would show that there is not just one kind of objective knowledge—or of arriving 
at objective truth. 
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Let us now turn to the details of Marcel’s recasting of the subject, which subsequently 
determined his philosophical outlook and approach.  
 Marcel, then, in contrast to Descartes, conceived of the subject as most 
essentially an embodied being in a situation,99as he puts it. For Marcel, Descartes’ 
notion of the subject as a disembodied mind was an arbitrary violence to the fullness 
of the concrete subject, however rationally justified he may have thought it to be. 
Through his detailed phenomenological analysis of the subject, Marcel concluded that 
Descartes’ assumption was fundamentally flawed, and that the subject, being primarily 
an embodied being in the world, was first and foremost in direct contact with the 
world she experienced, that is, with reality. If Descartes were to ask, or suggest, that 
such experiences could be put into question because they were perceptions of the mind 
or the subject, Marcel could question Descartes as to the possibility of such doubt. 
That is, under what conditions could his intellect, or any one’s intellect, doubt 
anything? Descartes’ answer could clearly be, “Through his own clear and distinct 
ideas and ability to think.” It can then be asked again, however, how such a possibility 
to think and, therefore, to doubt arises. Here is where Marcel could answer that it 
arises after we detach ourselves from the situation or world in which we live, are 
involved in, and are in contact with. Since thought is the precondition for “system 
building,” this is why he would also state that “a system is a spectacle which is there 
for a disengaged mind, a mind which is not itself enclosed within the panorama it 
beholds.”100 In other words, Marcel would suggest that the precondition for building a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 This expression, borrowed from Brendan Sweetman, accurately expresses one of Marcel’s central 
notions: that of the subject as an incarnate being or a being in a situation as expressed in this essay. 
100 Kenneth T. Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1975), 13. 
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philosophical system is a divorcing of the mind from its world. However, this is 
precisely what Marcel vehemently rejects: “For the human subject such a 
disengagement is unthinkable.”101 He also stated it quite clearly in Being and Having: 
“I cannot really stand aside from the universe (in which we exist), even in thought. 
Only by a meaningless pretence can I place myself at some vague point outside it.”102 
In light of this rejection, we are barred from the possibility of a totalizing 
philosophical system. The reason for such an impossibility, again, is that “the human 
mind cannot, even in pure thought, reach the central observatory of the absolute 
looker-on, for the startlingly simple reason that it is only by participating in reality that 
it exists at all.”103 Again, Marcel essentially reversed Descartes’ epistemology and 
suggested that the subject was an embodied being that was in contact with his world 
prior to his abstractions, his notions, or “clear and distinct ideas,” and therefore, could 
never be fully detached from it to become the “absolute looker-on.” This means that 
he thought that our contact with the world, with reality, is ontologically prior to ideas. 
A consequence of this, Marcel also suggested, was that the subject was not transparent 
to himself104 and if Descartes were right in his view, then it would be. As such, the 
foundation for the objectivity of man’s knowledge is actually not in his ideas, but 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 Ibid., 13. 
102 Marcel, Being and Having, 19. 
103 Ibid. One place Marcel expressed a similar thought is in Being and Having, p. 27. There he stated, 
“Thought cannot go beyond existence. It can only to some degree abstract from it, and it is of first 
importance that it should not be deceived by this abstraction.” 
104 This notion is clearly expressed by Gallagher: “Any mind detached from being could only deliver a 
verdict that was a pure construction: but knowledge which is a pure construction can only issue from a 
self which is a pure construction. Such a self would be absolutely transparent to itself, and this is clearly 
not the case with men. To recognize the non-transparency of the self is the supremely philosophical act: 
it is the intellectual counterpart of ontological humility.” Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, 
7. 
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within man’s own lived experience in the world. This, then, is the true foundation of 
knowledge for Marcel since we exist within Being. 
At this point, we can begin to see that two notions of truth arise, for Marcel 
ultimately did not reject abstract/objective knowledge as traditionally conceived, but 
simply showed that it was not the only kind of knowledge, nor the most fundamental. 
He merely relegated Descartes’ form of objective “scientific” knowledge to the realm 
of what he called the problematic or the world of primary reflection, which is the 
mode of abstract thinking that gives rise to our “objective” systems of thought. Marcel 
generally defined a problem as that which confronts a person and is in need of a 
solution that is accessible to all. A problem forces a person to detach from his concrete 
situation in the world in order to arrive at such a universal solution; it is this kind of 
reflection—problem solving reflection or primary reflection—that is the source of all 
abstract thinking: from our everyday reasoning to our more complex theoretical 
systems of thought such as that within math, science, and abstract philosophical 
thought. However, Marcel showed that this kind of thinking does not properly 
illuminate or explain the reality of the living subject.105  
If this is all the case, then we can clearly understand why Marcel’s view forces 
us to reconsider what our proofs for God could achieve, for analytic philosophy, being 
influenced by Descartes, has taken this approach, which Marcel patently rejected as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 However, if he rejects this approach and notion of the subject, what happens to our correspondence 
theory? Well, clearly the foundation of such a notion of truth collapses and we are left either with no 
knowledge or with a notion of truth and knowledge that does not depend upon such a notion of 
correspondence—and we can conceive a knowledge outside of correspondence and universal 
verifiability—or we must recast a different notion of correspondence that does not involve the 
ontological priority of ideas over our embodied contact with the world in our knowledge. Contrary to 
Descartes, Marcel found the world, existence, including the reality of others, to be indubitable, that is, 
that which must be presupposed before any philosophical inquiry.  
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being appropriate for the most fundamental questions of philosophy: the existence of 
God being among them. What Marcel suggested is that there is an entire realm of 
reality which has not been properly explored because of the previous conceptual 
prejudice and mode of approach in traditional philosophy and this is what he called the 
realm of mystery or Being. He called mystery a problem “which encroaches upon its 
own data, invading them, as it were, and thereby transcending itself as a simple 
problem.”106 Under this view, then, things such as love, hate, evil, fidelity, faith, hope, 
and God are within what he calls mystery and can be known only within the realm of 
mystery itself. However, it must become clear that by mystery he did not mean 
something that could not be solved at present but that in theory may have a solution. 
By its very nature, a mystery is that which remains insoluble to objective thought, but 
that is not, for this reason, subjective or unknowable. What Marcel classified as being 
within the realm of Being or mystery can surely be known, but not through conceptual 
analysis alone; rather, it can be said to be known in either of two ways: through direct 
contact, so to speak, or revealed through a phenomenological description focused upon 
concrete existence. In other words, through a phenomenological analysis, it is possible 
to become aware of what has been implicit within our experience; this process is what 
he sometimes characterizes as secondary reflection and secondary reflection most 
essentially, or generally, can be characterized as a reflection that puts us into contact 
with Being or mystery107 or, in essence, reality. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Marcel, The Philosophy of Existentialism, 19. 
107 In light of this, as we shall see, God can only be known through description (or secondary 
reflection), which can then make one aware and see one’s previous experience differently. This also 
shows why the traditional proofs would fail, for God, then, would not be an idea, or concept, but a 
concrete reality (as Thompte points out as well). If God were the conclusion of a logical proof, he 
would be an idea or would be conceived as an object outside the mind, as a “truth” we were seeking to 
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At this point, then, the grounding for Marcel’s approach has been established, 
which, can be understood in contrast to his critique of traditional philosophy, and 
specifically of Descartes. Specifically, we have seen that because Marcel reversed 
Descartes’ view of the subject, the character and approach of his philosophy was 
radically changed, such that it focused upon the lived reality of the subject and a 
detailed analysis of concrete experience, as opposed to an attempt to prove certain 
proposition through logical demonstrations. Having said this, we are now in a position 
to explore his insights and method with respect to the existence of God. 
 
Ontological Exigence As Existential Proof 
At this juncture, we endeavor to explore Marcel’s notion of ontological 
exigence in conjunction with the notion of an existential proof in light of what has 
been said above. The central issue that can be discerned from the above is that, for 
Marcel, Descartes’ notion of the self is a pure construction, and as a pure construction, 
any “knowledge” derived from such a self must also be a pure construction. In other 
words, “Any mind detached from being could only deliver a verdict that was a pure 
construction.”108 It is this central notion that colors Marcel’s approach and moves him 
toward a thought and approach that remains as closely tied to our concrete reality in 
the world as possible. It is for this reason that he characterizes his approach at 
different points as starting from the concrete, moving to the abstract, and then back to 
the concrete. As he described it in one place, “My method of advance does invariably 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
establish, or determine whether it corresponds with our inner thoughts, and this is precisely what he 
criticized in Descartes. 
108 Gallagher, The Philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, 7. 
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consist, as the reader will have noticed already, in working my way up from life to 
thought and then down from thought to life again, so that I may try to throw more light 
upon life.”109 This illustrates for us more clearly that what Marcel had in mind was 
that in our attempt to ascertain truth or know reality, we cannot remove ourselves from 
our contact with the world or our lived experience—for our existence cannot be 
conceived of as other than within being, as we have seen. The only problem that this 
poses is that if “I am altogether engaged in being,” then, “ no merely objective 
judgment upon it is possible.”110 Hence, we are forced to alter our approach to 
something other than a merely objective approach, which is how Marcel, in fact, 
proceeded, and through his phenomenological analyses, ended by discovering what he 
called ontological exigence, which I will also show can be thought of as an of 
existential proof.  
Ontological exigence is a central notion in Marcel, which he discussed at 
length in many of his works, including his famous two-volume lecture series, The 
Mystery of Being. He dealt with this notion at some length in these works, and what 
we are presented there is a progression and a development of the thought—although it 
should be noted that he did not necessarily arrive at these through the same 
progression in other of his works. The notion plays such a significant role in Marcel 
that he ascribed to it the reason for the philosopher’s quest; this is the essential claim 
that is made in the first volume of The Mystery of Being. He described the ontological 
exigency as an inner demand in man or as the need for transcendence and that this is 
what propels the philosopher to philosophize. In volume two of The Mystery of Being, 
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we also see that he identified the need as more specifically the need for Being, which 
he also equates with God—and the reason for this shall become clear as we go along.  
We have already seen that Marcel did not think it possible to abstract from 
being and we must thus explore reality through our concrete experiences rather than 
through abstract thought. In his attempt at such an exploration of our existence as it is 
lived in the world, he came to discover the notion of an absolute exigence that he 
sometimes called the existence for Being, as mentioned above. He suggested through 
many concrete examples that man is guided by this ontological exigence for 
transcendence and that if man ignores such an exigence he is likely to come to despair 
or experience the world as broken, as he sometimes referred to it. One such concrete 
example is the phenomenological analysis of one who is attempting to prove the 
existence of God. This is an instance in which we see ontological exigence revealed 
through Marcel’s phenomenological analysis/description. He explained that, in reality, 
the natural theologian would not undertake the endeavor to prove God if he were not 
guided by something other than pure reason. Marcel declared that 
An “objective” demonstration of the existence of God is impossible. An objective 
demonstration pretends to prescind from the absolute exigence. But if a would-be 
theologian really did this, no demonstration would ever be forthcoming. . . . reality 
treated as pure “object” could not serve as a premise to establish a conclusion with 
transcendent value.111  
 
It is here suggested that the very attempt to prove God must come from something 
other than a simple objective treatment of reality, hence, the proof presupposes that 
which Marcel called ontological exigence. In another place, speaking of mystery, 
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which can be equated with his view of the knowledge of God since he is within 
Mystery, Marcel stated the following: 
It is clear that the apprehension of the ontological mystery as meta-problematic is 
the motive force of this recovery through reflection. But we must not fail to notice 
that it is a reflexive motion of the mind that is here in question, and not a heuristic 
process. The proof can only confirm for us what has really been given to us in 
another way.112  
 
The “heuristic process” would here be a logical proof for God, but he affirmed that a 
proof can only confirm what has been given to us another way. Ontological existence, 
then, in reality precedes any genuine attempt at a demonstration, for Marcel. Further 
than this, it is one of the central ways that we have access to Being or God, aside from 
its propelling us toward attempts at objective proofs or demonstrations. In other 
words, ontological exigence is one of the ways in which one may actually become 
aware of transcendence or God, without which, proofs for God would not be 
forthcoming.  
 What the above shows, then, is that a person who endeavors to prove God must 
do so out of a desire that God exists; that is, his implicit or explicit desire that God 
exists is what propels him to prove God. As a result, we see that with this observation, 
Marcel was suggesting that ontological exigence is actually a mode of participation 
that explains our turning toward the search of a meta-problematic reality and which 
moreover, precedes any logical proof—and in fact, may not entail it, as in the case of 
some persons of faith. As Gallagher put it, “The proof of God’s existence,” rather than 
some logical progression, “is an elevation to the level of thought of the participation 
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within which thought arises.”113 The real proof of God, then, could actually lie, 
according to Marcel, in our realization that our longing for transcendence or our 
ontological exigence itself is an indication of our participation in a higher reality. In 
one of the clearest expression of this thought I have come across, Gallagher expressed 
the following: 
Man’s assurance of the presence of being is not separable from his need for being. 
. . . This need, which verbally would seem to denote a mere absence or lack, is 
actually at the bottom of my deepest assurance of positivity. “Man is infinite lack”: 
but in so apprehending himself he utters the magic words which give him an 
absolute meaning and dispel the opacity of the world. We have spoken of the 
blinded intuition as shedding a light across experience, but we might just as well 
have spoken of the ontological exigence doing so. I am a source of light in so far 
as I participate in a transcendent: but ontological exigence is the mode in which my 
participation is revealed to me. [my emphasis]114 
 
This is a shocking and profound statement: our ontological exigence or need, instead 
of being an expression of a lack, is in fact an indication or revelation of our 
participation within Being. Hence, in so far as I am capable of experiencing115 this 
ontological demand, I am already participating in a transcendent reality. In other 
words, the exigence itself is the proof of the transcendent or the evidence of it.  
The “argument,” in fact, can be summarized quite easily, for it is essentially 
the same Augustine expression noted at the outset of this essay. Indeed, it could be 
said that Augustine was the precursor to this existential proof. Put this way, Marcel’s 
view was that we have a need for Being, that is, for transcendence or for God and this 
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115 The point turns on the fact that we are capable of experiencing this exigence, but not on the fact that 
we all actually have it or are aware of it. Marcel grants that it is possible for a person not to be aware of 
his ontological exigence or live in the world without experiencing such a demand or need. 
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need is satisfied only in and through God. Thus the proof, in this light, can go two 
ways, meaning that if God is the only thing that can fulfill it, then we know God to be 
real and that when we do not find fulfillment in God, or reject God, the result is that 
we fall into despair, or remain in a broken world as he sometimes described it. Of 
course, it is not so simplistically argued, for he did not argue in this way at all, 
especially since it would be considered an analytic form; instead he “argued” by his 
phenomenological description of this condition of man and from his detailed analysis 
that reflects both upon our common experiences as well as on his own experience. He 
concludes that the need for being is indeed part of the human condition, that is, part of 
the condition of man’s existence in the world or his existential structure, so to speak. 
Thus, he did not simply state this as an argument, but the notion is buttressed by the 
ontological perspective described above in which man is discovered to be enveloped 
within being, thus giving more credence or ontological weight to our experiences in 
the world.116  
The objection might be made at this point that Marcel presumed to know the 
longing of every person’s heart and could one not imagine that he could live quite 
happily without ever thinking of God? Marcel’s response to this would be that he 
never claimed that this awareness needed to be explicit. His claim was simply that we 
can be implicitly—or indeed explicitly—aware of God through certain experiences in 
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Marcel. How could these things be explained otherwise, he suggested. 
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our lives, and that without such an awareness, we would have trouble explaining some 
experiences and/or actions. For instance, even though a person may profess to be an 
atheist, his conviction that justice must be served and that it should be defended unto 
death would not exist—or be difficult to explain—if there were not some kind of 
implicit awareness of God, who is the source of all unconditional value.117 
However,Marcel was aware that this affirmation of God, based upon such a 
conviction, will not and does not occur to everyone, but surely there are some for 
whom such occurrences are experienced as an influx of transcendence which thus 
leads them to an affirmation of God. Of course, Marcel gave other accounts for his 
notion that our experiences of being in the ultimate sense must be of a Thou and are 
the condition for experiences such of fidelity and hope, but that this would be 
somewhat tangential to the focus of our present concern, which is upon the 
significance and meaning of ontological exigence. 
 One of the most telling passages in relation to ontological exigence that 
specifically lines up with our need for God, is when Marcel spoke of our need to ask 
the question “who” or “what am I.” It will be beneficial to quote the passage at length 
to capture the full impact of his thought:  
When I reflect upon the question “What am I?” taken as a single issue, I see that it 
means, “What is there in me that can answer this question?” Consequently, every 
answer to this question coming from me must be mistrusted.  
But could not someone else supply me with the answer? An objection 
immediately arises: the qualifications which the other may have which enable him 
to answer me, the eventual validity of what he says, are observed by me; but what 
qualifications have I for making this observation? I can therefore, only refer 
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lawgiver and that, therefore, there must be an eternal Lawgiver, that is, God.   
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myself without contradiction to a judgment which is absolute, but which is at the 
same time more within me than my own judgment. In fact, if I treat this judgment 
as in the least exterior to me, the question of what it is worth and how it is to be 
appreciated must inevitably be asked afresh. The question is then eliminated qua 
question and turns into an appeal. But perhaps in proportion as I take cognizance 
of this appeal qua appeal, I am led to recognize that the appeal is possible only 
because deep down in me there is something other than me, something further 
within me than I am myself—and at once the appeal changes its index.”118  
 
Thus, aside from our very need to ask the question, the significance of this passage lies 
in the question of who is qualified to answer the question “What am I?” He 
immediately suggested that we find ourselves in a dilemma since we might quickly 
discover that we are not qualified to answer the question, for “every answer coming 
from me must be mistrusted.” By this, Marcel meant that we are not in a position to 
judge objectively, for if we were, we would not have had the need to ask the question 
in the first place—we would be transparent to ourselves. For this reason, we cannot 
find an objective answer by ourselves and, thus, need recourse to an absolute judgment 
which is not our own; he also established that such objectivity could not be found by 
any other person who lies outside of us, for their judgment would therein be judged by 
us, leading us back into the initial dilemma. This is what forced Marcel to suggest that 
the “question is eliminated qua question and turns into an appeal,” an appeal toward 
something that is absolute, transcendent, and yet more deeply within us than we are to 
ourselves. That is, at the moment that we realize that we can not refer to anything or 
anyone outside of us to answer the question, and at the same time recognize that the 
question has transformed into an appeal, we can become aware that the appeal, as he 
put it, has “changed its index” since the condition for the possibility of the appeal is 
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the recognition that there is something other than I, deeper within me than I am to 
myself that can answer the appeal. The appeal, then, toward something other than I 
that can answer the question is an expression of our ontological exigence, which also 
indicates, for the first time, why the ontological exigence must also be understood to 
be toward an absolute Thou. 
 To illustrate the link between ontological exigence and the notion of an 
absolute Thou in Marcel, let us look at one further passage from Creative Fidelity 
where he spoke about exigence: 
We are now perhaps in a better position to give an answer to the question who am 
I, or, more properly, to the question who are we who can ask who we are. 
Formulated in this way the question emphasizes the radical ontological lack of 
self-sufficiency in the human condition itself. Not only am I a person only in the 
presence of another person, but this mutually constituted presence itself is wholly 
oriented toward and dependent upon an absolute Thou. It is not only I who must 
find my center beyond myself, but we as well. The fact that our center lies beyond 
us changes the question into an appeal: ‘You alone really know me and judge me; 
to doubt you is not to free myself but to annihilate myself.’119  
 
Here, we find clearly expressed, not only our exigence for Being, but also, for Being 
as an absolute Thou, as God, who is the only one who can satisfy the need and answer 
our appeal for self disclosure—since we cannot fully know ourselves. He begins the 
passage by showing that human beings are ontologically insufficient on our own, not 
only because we are mutually constituted selves in need of the presence of others, but 
also because, even together, we are insufficient, as a group, since we must still find 
our “center” or what constitutes us. As a result, then, our exigence shows that we are 
wholly dependent upon an absolute Thou that engulfs us and is deeper within us than 
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we are to ourselves and can truly know us and judge us. To deny such a Thou as is 
implied here is to forgo any truly valid answer to the question “Who am I?” or “Who 
are we?” since we would have eliminated the only way such a question could be 
answered—we would be left unable to know ourselves, thus his claim, “To doubt you 
is not to free myself but to annihilate myself.”  
 Let us conclude this section by returning to its initial concern and ask, “How 
exactly does the foregoing constitute an existential proof of God?” Our initial step 
toward an answer was to show that Marcel first and foremost reversed the Cartesian 
assumption of a disembodied subject, thereby negating the ontological weight or 
validity of ideas in casting its vote upon reality. Then we established that in contrast to 
Descartes, the subject, for Marcel, was a being environed within a world, enshrined in 
being; and thus, being “altogether engaged in Being” in this way, preventing us from 
the ability to give a merely objective judgment upon it. This means, then, that a 
genuine analysis of Being must come, not through an objective approach, but through 
a “subjective” approach like that of Marcel that explores the concrete subject as he 
encounters reality. Only as such can we get close to an apprehension of Being. In light 
of this, then, we have established that Being can be revealed through a 
phenomenological analysis of the living subject in the world, since thoughts are no 
longer given arbitrary ontological priority over the experience of the living subject and 
her encounter with Being. It is thus that Marcel’s ontological exigence can be taken as 
a serious claim to the reality of a transcendent being he called an absolute Thou. Given 
that we are immersed within being, our primordial encounter and experience with 
reality, when examined in their subtleties, should be taken quite seriously. Again, the 
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final point is that what I am calling an existential proof of God—ontological 
exigence—arises from the fact that we are immersed within being or participate within 
it and are thus entitled to say with Marcel that “man’s assurance of the presence of 
being is not separable from his need for being.” Our need for being is thus not the 
evidence of a lack but a revelation of our rooted-ness and dependence upon God, 
without whom our experiences in the world would not be colored as they are.   
 
Kierkegaard and Despair 
In this section, we explore the parallels between Kierkegaard and Marcel with 
respect to the above notion of an existential proof. This shall not be an extended 
analysis of Kierkegaard on the issue, since the notion of an existential proof has 
already been discussed at some depth above. However, we will simply examine how 
the notion shows up in Kierkegaard’s philosophy, as well. Let us briefly review 
Kierkegaard as we proceed. 
Because of his psychological genius, Kierkegaard was aware of the will of 
man. He thus knew well that the will is a major factor in man’s rejection or acceptance 
of God; hence, he rarely approached the issue directly. He used his indirect approach: 
his pseudonyms. Now the purpose of this was to, in some sense, respect the freedom 
of man, for he thought we are essentially free and that it was up to us to make the 
choice to move toward God or not, to live a certain kind of existence or not, and that 
this choice was ultimately up to us. However, as we already know, Kierkegaard was 
trying to communicate a certain truth, for he wanted to move people into a genuine 
religious existence. Thus, what did he accomplish through his pseudonyms? He 
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developed three spheres of existence, which he called the esthetic, the ethical, and the 
ethical-religious. He then expressed that he was trying to seduce people into the 
religious. He explained that this was his purpose from the beginning of his writing 
career, that he was always religious and had a religious goal. It should be clearly noted 
that he did believe his “goal” aimed toward something objectively real. In other words, 
he was attempting to transmit a truth that he could not communicate through objective 
means or approaches. Thus, what he did in the unsigned works was to show, 
essentially, that the lives of the non-religious are essentially in despair and that our 
only salvation from despair is a life of faith. 
This is all clearly and beautifully stated in his Sickness Unto Death, where he 
stated that the state of most men is despair and not to be in despair is to be in the 
“state” of faith, where despair has been rooted out—this is done by “resting 
transparently in the power that established”120 the self. In other words, we can only 
escape despair when we rest in God and if we do not rest in God, we are in despair, 
and there, one can reasonably argue, is the exact phenomenological “proof” found in 
Marcel that we have described above.  
God is the ground of our being for Kierkegaard, as he stated in Works Of 
Love,121 and thus we are incomplete and restless without him: as in Augustine. Of 
course, like Marcel, Kierkegaard was keen enough not to suggest that we are literally 
feeling our despair or feeling depressed, when we do not trust or believe in God 
consciously—he, in fact, explained that someone can be in despair and not be aware of 
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it, and even fool himself into thinking that he is happy and has no need of God.122 
Despair, for Kierkegaard, was a technical term that describes the state of an individual 
who is not properly relating to God, to the ground of his being—sometimes he 
expressed this as not relating absolutely to the absolute and relatively to the relative. 
However, it is significant to note that when one is in despair and not aware of it, it is 
always possible to become aware of it; this is partly what Marcel and Kierkegaard 
seem to have attempted to make us aware of. While Marcel expressed it by saying that 
we have an Ontological need for Being or Ontological exigence, without which we 
live as in a broken world, Kierkegaard would say that we need God, to rest in Him, 
and that without a proper relation to the ground of our Being, the God who created us, 
we are in despair and are never fully ourselves in the deepest sense or experience 
ultimate fulfillment. In his own words, he stated, “The formula that describes the state 
of the self when despair is completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and 
in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.”123 It 
is evident from this that, for Kierkegaard, despair is to not be properly related to God, 
and that to remove despair was to “rest transparently in the power that established” us, 
that is, in God. Of course, it is also evident that this is how he defined faith, for the 
opposite of despair is faith.   
Let us attempt at this point, to make it more explicit why the Kierkegaardian 
view we are unveiling can qualify as a similar existential proof outlined above. In like 
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enjoying ourselves, but that with a disruption of these pleasures, it would become evident by our 
reaction that we were in despair all along.  
123 Kierkegaard, Sickness Unto Death, 14. 
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manner to Marcel, Kierkegaard stated that “the human self is such a derived, 
established relation, a relation that relates itself to itself and in relating itself to itself 
relates itself to another.”124 In other words, because we are an established relation, we 
are incomplete without a proper recognition of this relation since we are dependent 
upon this ground that established us. In fact, he was suggesting here that in relating to 
ourselves, we can inadvertently, as earlier in Marcel, realize that in the deepest sense 
we are relating to God in our inquiry or that in our seeking for ourselves, we 
eventually find our need for God in self-realization and to answer the question “Who 
am I?” Furthermore, this is what provides the context for the claim that we could not 
or would not despair if the above description of our ontological dependence on God 
were not the case. That is, because we are constituted by God and are dependent upon 
Him, we are thus in an inadequate state of being when we live in discord or in 
rejection of God, whether consciously or unconsciously. Kierkegaard explained it in 
the following passage: 
This is why there can be two forms of despair in the strict sense. If a human self 
had itself established itself, then there could be only one form: not to will to be 
oneself, to will to do away with oneself, but there could not be the form: in despair 
to will to be oneself. This second formulation is specifically the expression for the 
complete relation (of the self), the expression for the inability of the self to arrive 
at or to be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by 
relating itself to that which established the relation.125   
 
This clearly reveals the answer to the question we began with, for here we see that 
Kierkegaard’s view was that we, indeed, would not despair if we were not beings that 
were constituted by God and dependent upon God. To speak more faithfully about this 
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particular passage, we would only despair in one way—by not wanting to be ourselves 
or to “want to do away with” ourselves—but there would not be the kind of despair 
that is the “expression for the inability . . . to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and at 
rest by itself,”126 but only by relating itself to that which established the self, that is, 
God. In other words, the kind of despair that realizes the need for God would not exist 
in anyone if a human being were not established by and in need of God. 
 Hence, in light of the above, we can already see the direct parallels of Marcel’s 
notion of ontological exigence. If we consider a few other passages from Kierkegaard 
this becomes even clearer. Consider the following passage: 
In other words, what makes a person despair is not misfortune but his lack of the 
eternal. Despair is to lack the eternal . . . Despair is not, therefore, the loss of the 
beloved—that is unhappiness, pain, suffering—but despair is the lack of the 
eternal.127  
 
Perhaps no clearer expression can be had to illustrate the fact that for Kierkegaard, as 
for Marcel, we are in a kind of incompleteness without God, for here we are only to 
replace the term eternal with God to see that Kierkegaard is plainly stating that we are 
in fact in despair when we lack God. In another passage he explained:  
Despair is due to relating oneself with infinite passion to a particular something, 
for one can relate oneself with infinite passion—unless one is in despair—only to 
the eternal. Spontaneous love is in despair in this way, but when it becomes happy, 
as it is called, its being in despair is hidden from it; when it becomes unhappy, it 
becomes manifest that it was in despair.128  
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127 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 41. 
128 Ibid., 40. 
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Here is yet another instance that reveals Kierkegaard’s view that the self is 
incomplete, or unfulfilled, without relating with infinite passion to God. Hence, it can 
be said, as he appeared to suggest in the SUD quoted earlier, that such despair would 
not occur if there were not a God who establishes the self as such a dependent being 
and who fulfills such a lack. Thus, we have reached the point of unveiling the 
connection between Kierkegaard and Marcel on the notion of an existential proof, for 
what we have shown is that the ontological exigence has an obvious parallel in the 
notion of despair and faith in Kierkegaard. All we have left to reference is the positive 
element of their connection, that is, how faith compares to Marcel. 
 In the section on Marcel above, we made mention of the fact that his existential 
proof had two moments: that of the negative side of the ontological exigence as 
providing an occasion for revealing that we are in need of Being or God and second, 
that such a longing does find fulfillment—only through God. Thus, these two 
moments provided what I called an existential/phenomenological proof since neither 
occasion—the positive nor the negative expression of the exigence—would be 
possible without God. In Kierkegaard then, we have made it explicit that despair is the 
negative expression of the negative moment of the ontological exigence. Faith, 
however, would reveal the positive side of the two moments of the existential proof 
discussed in Marcel. That is, faith would resemble the fullness of Being spoken of by 
Marcel and that, in faith, we have rooted out despair and thus found a kind of 
fulfillment or rest within our lives, within our beings, through God. This “rest” that is 
also a kind of constituting of the self is to be seen as an existential proof since the 
condition of the possibility of such a fulfillment is that there is such a God who fills 
 116 
the cavity of despair. In Kierkegaard’s own words, we, indeed, cannot be indifferent to 
the role of faith in our lives as if it were some conceptual conclusion that one could 
live with but be quite indifferent to it: 
But the goods of the spirit are only in the inner being, are only in the possession, 
and therefore a person cannot, if he actually possess them, be as one who does not 
possess them; on the contrary, if one is such a person, one simply does not possess 
them at all. If anyone thinks he has faith and yet is indifferent toward this 
possession, is nether cold not hot, he can be certain that he does not have faith.129  
 
In other words, faith is the fulfillment of something that previously was lacking; 
hence, one could not be indifferent to it. Just as despair, for Kierkegaard, constituted a 
kind of phenomenological proof of God, faith also provides such an assurance in being 
the only way to quench the longing of the soul.   
Conclusion 
In the end, what have we come to learn about the possibility of an existential 
proof of God through Kierkegaard and Marcel? First and foremost, we have found that 
the common ground between them is that they both attempt to bring us into contact 
with our concrete reality, and further, that this concrete reality within which we find 
ourselves is the only place within which any relevant truth or meaning is to be found 
by us in this all-too-human existence. But more specifically, with respect to the 
question of the existence of God we saw that they both illuminate a path for us that is 
contrary to all traditional conceptual approaches to God, which would have us follow 
some logical deductions toward our affirmation of God. We saw that they found this 
approach profoundly lacking and that, on the contrary, such an approach might detract 
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from the only true way that a knowledge of God is possible, that is, through a careful 
analysis of our existence, or as Gallagher put it, 
Being’s role in thought is not so much that of a concept as it is a creative intuition 
analogous to that of the artist. The presentiment of transcendence haunts human 
experience, as the artist’s intuition haunts his consciousness. Just as the artist’s 
intuition only comes to be recognized in the artistic process which it alone makes 
possible, so the presence of being is only recognized by being read back out of the 
human experience which it alone makes possible.130  
 
This beautifully expresses the entire impetus of Kierkegaard and Marcel's writing with 
respect to God, for their central claim was that we cannot find God outside of our 
experience and certainly not in pure thought. Even more poignantly, it could even be 
said that for Marcel and Kierkegaard, our proof could never be in the text itself 
(strictly speaking), though the closest would be the kind of phenomenological 
descriptions they have provided, but rather, in our own encounter with transcendence, 
with God, as He can be encountered or be read out of our experience in the world. 
Indeed, it is only from our lived experience in the world that God can truly be known 
and encountered, and not as the conceptual result of a logical proof. Thus, if there is to 
be any knowledge of God through what I have chosen to call an existential proof, it is 
ultimately to be found within our own experience in the world and the text is only a 
sign or a pointer to look upon our existence in the way that Marcel and Kierkegaard 
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pointed us to, within which we may find the transcendence that we are consciously or 
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